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THE ROLE OF APPELLATE COURTS IN 
MANDATORY SENTENCING SCHEMES* 
Larry I. Palmer** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During an era of judicial activism in America, appellate 
courts have promulgated detailed rules for scrutinizing police con-
duct and trial court holdings, while they have by and large ig-
nored the issues surrounding sentencing. As a consequence, 
public and scholarly expositions of the criminal process in recent 
years have focused on appellate review of pre-trial and trial deci-
sions. 1 Since the articulated goal of this effort has been the protec-
tion of individualliberty,2 it is surprising, and unfortunate, that so 
little attention has been devoted to post-trial decisions, which also 
affect that liberty. 
A. The Policy of Discretion in Sentencing -
The willingness to subject pre-trial and trial decisions to in-
tensive appellate review while withholding appellate scrutiny 
from decisions about sentencing and parole reflects a peculiarly 
American way of handling conflicting goals. By tolerating the co-
. existence of "legally bound agents" -police and trial judges-and 
• This Article is part of a larger work on the general problems of sentencing. 
Part of the research done in conjunction with this Article was supported by a grant 
from the Ford Foundation. The opinion and conclusions expressed are those of the 
author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions or conclusions of the Ford Founda-
tion. 
The author would also like to express his appreciation to Alan P. Young and 
Matthew J. Finch, students at Cornell Law School, for their research assistance in 
preparation of this Article. 
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"free agents" -prison officials, parole board members, and sen-
tencing judges-society attempts to satisfy its desires for both so-
cial control and the protection of the rights of the accused. It is 
acknowledged that the transgressor should be subject to social 
control because of what he has done and also that his rights and 
individuality should be protected in the process. The system of 
guilt determination is infused with broad notions of "due process" 
which imply that "legal" rather than "factual" guilt should ulti-
mately determine who will be subject to state control. On the 
other hand, sentencing and corrections decisions are guided by the 
desire to "individualize punishment."3 
Thus, the sentencing judge is given broad discretion by legis-
lative enactments designed to permit him to tailor the sentence to 
fit the convicted criminal. One argument asserted in defense of 
this policy is that the individualization of punishment through a 
system of free agents best achieves the goals of "reformation and 
rehabilitation."4 If a sentence is ill-suited to a particular offender, 
the sentencing judge is always subject to reversal for abuse of dis-
cretion. Under this view, however, such instances of appellate 
court intervention should be rare since judge's decisions are infre-
quently reversed for abuse of discretion. 
Confidence in the efficacy of a policy which rests sentencing 
discretion in trial judges has led to the creation of other free 
agents. Thus, correctional officials have been given broad discre-
tion in their application of penal laws to criminal offenders, and 
various legal doctrines have been developed to inhibit the judici-
ary from influencing or modifying the actions of prison and parole 
officials.5 Indeed, such confidence raises a further argument in 
support of judicial non-reviewability of the practices of these free 
agents. This rational is essentially one of institutional compe-
tence. 
It is often argued that the adoption of any particular penal 
policy to control sentencing judges and correctional officials in 
their dealings with offenders is simply not a judicial function. 6 
3. See generally id. at 1-6. 
4. /d. at 3-4. 
5. See Note, Beyond the Ken o.f the Courts: A Critique o.f Judicial Rifusalto Re-
view the Complaints o.f Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 ( 1963). 
6. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,406-11 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting). Justice Blackmun's personal distaste for the death penalty was explicitly 
stated: "[w]ere I a legislator, I would vote against the death penalty .... " /d. at 406. 
He saw his judicial role differently: 
I do not sit on these cases, however as a legislator, responsive, at least in 
part, to the will of constituents. Our task here, as must so frequently be 
emphasized and re-emphasized, is to pass upon the constitutionality of 
legislation that has been enacted and that is challenged. This is the sole 
task for judges. 
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Rather, the enactment of specific policies to guide correctional of-
ficials or sentencing judges is uniquely within the competence of 
the legislature. Following this line of analysis, a growing number 
of legislatures have attempted to reform sentencing and correc-
tional practices through the enactment of a variety of mandatory 
sentencing schemes.7 
The position advocated here, however, is that the post-con-
viction treatment of individuals must be subject to legal review by 
the appellate courts. Convicted persons justifiably may be subject 
to society's control, but the need to control the criminal does not 
warrant the unregulated use of mandatory sentences. In fact, as 
will be demonstrated later, some legislative attempts to limit dis-
cretion through mandatory sentencing schemes serve only to shift 
discretionary decision making from one sentencing official to 
other decision makers. 8 Furthermore, the convicted person is pro-
tected by a practice of "individualized punishment" only when the 
appellate courts actively participate in the administration of sanc-
tions.9 The entire doctrine of official discretion needs to be re-
placed by a new mode of analysis compatible with modern views 
of the goals of the criminal law. In effect, a new jurisprudence of 
sentencing is needed. 10 
B. Discretion and Assumptions about American Criminal Law 
The alternative method of legal analysis proposed here stems 
from the belief that the discretion of sentencing officials should be 
governed by legal standards developed to insure the fairness and 
efficacy of post-conviction treatment. This method of analysis is 
based on four assumptions about modern American criminal law. 
First, the method posits a distinction between "dispositive" and 
"adjudicative" decision making within American criminal law. 
/d. at 410-11. 
7. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203 (West Supp. 1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 775.087(2) (West Supp. 1979); MAsS. ANN. LAWS ch. 269, § 10 (Michie/Law. Co-op 
Supp. 1978). 
See also TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING: 
FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976) [hereinafter cited as FAIR AND CERTAIN 
PUNISHMENT); A. YON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS: RE-
PORT OF THE CoMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF INCARCERATION (1976) [hereinafter 
cited as DOING JuSTICE). According to the National Institute of Law Enforcement 
and Criminal Justice, study solicitation document of August 24,_ 1977, _at least 40 
states are considering some form of determinate sentencing to supplant their current 
sentencing systems. For a discussion of various scholarly works on determinate sen-
tencing, see Zimring, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 6 HASTINGS CENTER 
REP., lNST. Soc'Y, ETHICS & LIFE SCI. 13 (1976). 
8. See notes 168-80 & accompanying text infra. 
9. See notes 181-83 & accompanying text infra. 
10. See generally Palmer, A Model o/ Criminal Dispositions, note I supra; see also 
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). 
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The term "disposition" includes any decision in which an official 
'oLthe legal system is empowered to exercise direct control over 
another individual. 11 Under this definition, trial judge sentencing 
decisions are part of a larger category of legal decisions that in-
cludes decisions by prison and parole officials and even decisions 
that deprive individuals of their liberty through the civil process. 12 
"Adjudication," on the other hand, includes all issues that are de-
cided at trial and on appellate review of the trial process. Thus, 
issues concerning the exclusion of evidence, instruction of juries, 
and standards of proof are part of adjudicative decision making. 13 
Second, since the disposition of criminals is assumed to serve 
functions different from the adjudication of criminality, separate 
legal standards should govern the two types of decisions. The dis-
tinction between adjudication and disposition is a critical analyti-
cal device for understanding the effect of major innovations in 
American criminal law decision making. For instance, when this 
distinction is kept in mind, the "right to counsel" cases decided by 
the United States Supreme Court are better understood. 14 A pro-
phylactic requirement of counsel at triali 5 as a part of due process 
and the lack of such a requirement for probation or parole revoca-
tion hearings 16 under the same due process rubric are partially 
explained by the different kinds of legal decision making involved 
in adjudication and disposition.n 
Third, in order to integrate the various purposes served by 
disposition and adjudication, a method of explicitly analyzing the 
interests or values served by the criminal law is needed. 18 This 
II. See generally Palmer, A Model o/ Criminal Dispositions, note I supra. 
12. ld. McNeil v. Director, Patuxent lnst., 407 U.S. 245 (1972); Jackson v. Indi-
ana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972) (all discussing the 
institutional limitations on the use of civil dispositions). 
13. This definition of adjudication is in many respects similar to the ideal of legal 
guilt developed in the late Professor Packer's Due Process Model. See H. PACKER, 
THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149-72 (1968). The major divergence be-
tween Professor Packer's concept of legal guilt and the present definition of adjudica-
tion lies in the definitions of reviewing functions in criminal law decision making. 
Packer assumes that direct review of criminal convictions and collateral review of 
criminal convictions by way of habeas corpus can be analyzed under the same rubric. 
ld. at 227-38. This Article suggests that these functions ought to be separate. See 
Palmer, Implementing the Obligation o/ Advocacy in Review of Criminal Convictions, 
65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 267 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Palmer, Advocacy]. 
14. Palmer, Advocacy, supra note 13, at 274. 
15. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (due process right to 
counsel in felony trial). 
16. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (no due process right to counsel 
in probation revocation proceedings). 
17. See generally Palmer, Advocacy, note 13 supra. 
18. Palmer, A Model of Criminal Dispositions, supra note I, at 9-35. This method 
of analysis of the interests protected by the criminal law should not be confused with 
Professor Fletcher's characterizations of "socially protected interests." See Fletcher, 
The Metamorphosis o/ Larceny, 89 HARV. L. REV. 469, 519 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 
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method of analysis should seek to look behind the usual labels of 
"crime control," "due process," "crime prevention," and "social 
control" in discussing sentencing issues. More specifically, when 
dealing with issues of disposition, a method is required that con-
siders both the interests underlying legislative formulation of par-
ticular criminal offenses as well as "[t]he policies underlying 
court-developed constitutional limitations on criminal adjudica-
tion" 19 and disposition. 20 
For example, in analyzing the policies underlying homicide 
in its modern context, one would consider not only recent legisla-
tive innovations, but also recent constitutional pronouncements. 
These would include not only Supreme Court opinions regarding 
the death penalty for murder,21 but also those cases involving 
methods of proof in homicide.22 While such an analysis is beyond 
the scope of this Article, it can be said that this analysis of homi-
cide would involve an examination of the particular ways in 
which the values of human life and individual liberty23 are pro-
moted through the processes of criminal adjudication and disposi-
tion. Broadly speaking, this method of analysis is a means of 
integrating the substance and process of modern criminal law de-
cision making. 24 
Fletcher, Larceny]. Professor Fletcher identifies what he calls a "nineteenth century 
preference for classifying crimes as intrusions against specific socially protected inter-
ests." He goes on to suggest that a view of substantive criminal law as protection 
against certain interests, such as life, personal security, or property, makes moral con-
cerns, such as betrayal of a friend, insignificant. Under the analysis proposed in this 
Article, there is no a priori reason why moral concerns would not be part of the value 
analysis. For instance, the analysis of the crime of rape requires analysis of the soci-
ety's moral concerns about sexual integrity and normative judgments about sexual 
relations in general. In addition, an analysis of "defenses" requires clear articulation 
of various kinds of moral concerns. See note 50 infra. 
19. Palmer, A Model o/ Criminal Dispositions, supra note l, at 5. 
20. The present constitutional limitations on dispositions have involved two ma-
jor areas. First, there are limitations on the imposition of the death penalty. See, e.g., 
Coker v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 815 (1977); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Sec-
ond, there are lesser known constitutional limitations on the use of civil dispositions. 
See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (right to liberty); McNeil v. 
Director, Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245 (1972) (due process); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 
U.S. 715 (1972) (equal protection and due process); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 
(1972) (equal protection). 
21. See, e.g., Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
22. See, e.g., Handerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 (1977); Patterson v. 
New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). 
23. Historically, the substantive structure of the American crime of homicide and 
the methods of imposing the death penalty have been related. The development of 
degrees of murder in America was related to an attempt to avoid the death penalty for 
some offenders. See, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) (discussing 
the relationship of the death penalty to the substantive definition of homicide). 
24. This view also represents one interpretation of the promulgation function of 
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A fourth and final assumption about the American criminal 
law is that appellate courts, rather than legislatures, should per-
form the interest analysis underlying rulemaking for disposition. 
Traditionally, these courts have assumed the forefront in analyz-
ing particular social control practices. For example, the appellate 
courts were the first to question the operation of civil commitment 
statutes25 and to conform the operation of this alternative social 
control method to some principles oflegality. One need not argue 
that the legislature has no voice in dispositional decision making. 
Rather, the position taken here is that the appellate courts should 
articulate the social interest to be served in dispositional rule mak-
ing and that the legislatures should enact dispositional methods 
that best serve those identified interests.26 
The proponents of mandatory sentencing ignore the role of 
the courts for two reasons. First, they assume that the disposi-
tional issues can be separated from the basic policy questions that 
underlie the criminal law; however, the assertion here is that dis-
positional and substantive policy decisions are interrelated. Sec-
ond, the proponents of mandatory sentencing fail to recognize 
fully all the ramifications of the various methods of social control. 
Understanding these ramifications will require a full exegesis of 
the role of legislatures and appellate courts in modern criminal 
law decision making. The contention of this Article is that courts 
. have been making policy choices in the course of administering 
. the criminal law and will continue to do so under newly enacted 
mandatory schemes. Further, the failure to consider the proper 
role of courts in dispositional decision making has obscured the 
policy choices that must be made in adopting or rejecting legisla-
tively mandated sentencing. 
C. The Alternative Analysis o/ Mandatory Sentencing Schemes 
Part II of this Article uses an interest analysis to critique 
the American criminal law. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. DERSHOWITZ & R. SCHWARTZ, 
CRIMINAL LAW: THEORY AND PROCESS 251-1224 (1974). 
25. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); McNeil v. Director, Patux-
ent lnst., 407 U.S. 245 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Humphrey v. 
Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972). 
26. Where the limited utility of criminal dispositions for some purposes has been 
recognized and alternative civil forms have been made available, the legislature's ma-
jor function is to choose the method of social control. For instance, whether the crim-
inal process or the family court ought to be used as a means of social control in 
"family assault" cases is a question that a modem legislature is equipped to address 
and decide. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT§§ 811-846 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 
1978). The criminal process should not be excluded automatically, rather it must be 
consciously chosen over the alternative methods of social control. Once the appellate 
court has identified the particular social interests to be served, the legislative choice 
can be made more easily and intelligently. 
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some specific mandatory sentencing schemes. First, the means by 
which an appellate court should approach issues of disposition 
under the analysis are summarized. Next, selected legislative en-
actments imposing mandatory minimum jail terms in the areas of 
gun controP7 and drug abuse are examined.28 This analysis illus-
trates the inadequacies of existing theories with respect to the allo-
cation of sentencing authority between appellate courts and 
legislatures. In Part III, an examination of one jurisdiction's at-
tempt to impose more certain sentences by eliminating parole29 
demonstrates the proper relationship between courts and the cor-
rectional processes. Finally, Part IV analyzes a comprehensive at-
tempt by one legislature to establish fixed or mandated 
sentences. 30 This analysis reveals the basic deficiencies in a legis-
lative view of sentencing that does not consider the appellate 
court's role in administering dispositional policy. 
The current movement to impose legislatively determined 
fixed sentences is supported by a growing body of literature.31 
The reform efforts have assumed a utilitarian posture in justifying 
a particular form of disposition. Under this view, if rehabilitation 
does not work, deterrence or retribution should be the justification 
for reform. Adherents of this theory also support the view that the 
legislature can resolve all policy issues involved in mandatory sen-
tencing. Those "reformers" who advocate legislatively deter-
mined mandatory sentences, however, fail to recognize the crucial 
role of the appellate courts in dispositional decision making. 
This view bears two defects. First, the reformers' perspective 
is functionally simplistic. To justify a recommendation on the 
ground that it is "the legislature's function to determine punish-
ment," is to ignore the complexity of the relationship between the 
appellate courts and legislatures. Second, this view fails to con-
front the moral issues raised by viewing the criminal law and its 
processes as instruments of social control over the lives of individ-
ual members of the community. These reformers have not offered 
a method of value analysis for legislative dispositional decision 
making. Facing these issues does not lobby either for or against 
imposing state control; instead, the intent is to articulate the value 
choices incident to the exercise of, or the failure to exercise, a cer-
tain form of social control through the criminallaw.32 
27. See notes 51-62 & accompanying text infra. 
28. See notes 91-102 & accompanying text infra. 
29. See notes 168-80 & accompanying text infra. 
30. See notes 212-51 & accompanying text infra. 
31. See, e.g., FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT, note 7 supra; DOING JUSTICE, 
note 7 supra; J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME ( 1975). 
32. Examining the "reforms" of a modern indeterminate sent.encing scheme will 
help to clarify the relevance of the historical origins of the idea of mandatory scntenc-
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The Article concludes by recommending that the call for leg-
islatively mandated sentences be resisted. It is asserted that the 
need for more certain sentences will be served better if the inter-
ests that underlie the use of criminal sanctions33 in our modern 
legal system are more clearly articulated. This functional ap-
proach to the problems of criminal dispositions and to the crimi-
nal process generally should lead to the establishment of a more 
active policy-making role for appellate courts in dispositional de-
cision making. A mode of analysis that conceives of a more than 
nominal role for appellate courts also makes more explicit the 
roles of the various other decision makers. In particular, it is ar-
gued that the legislature must choose whether to use the criminal 
law as an instrument of social control, while it is up to the appel-
late courts to develop policies for the administration of authorized 
criminal dispositions in individual lives. This division of policy-
making authority between legislatures and appellate courts is pro-
posed because the use of the criminal law as a means of social 
control presents unique kinds of value questions that are best re-
solved by appellate courts.34 
In one area of deep value conflict, the imposition of a 
mandatory death penalty, appellate courts have already begun to 
ask fundamental questions about the nature of the dispositional 
processes. While this Article does not fully resolve these issues, it 
attempts to generate a mode of analysis in which these questions 
are made visible and thus amenable to discussion and perhaps 
eventual resolution. 
11. LEGISLATIVELY AUTHORIZED MANDATORY SENTENCING: 
WHO IS MAKING DISPOSITIONAL POLICY? 
Much legislative activity has been devoted to enacting 
mandatory sentencing schemes. However, that approach over-
looks the crucial role of the appellate courts in dispositional policy 
making. In what follows, an "interest analysis" of the appropriate 
policy-making role of the appellate courts is discussed. Then, se-
lected legislative enactments are examined in order to illustrate 
ing to the current discussion. This Article argues that the task force and the political 
ieaders of various persuasions recommending legislatively mandated sentences may 
have given new impetus to notions of retribution, ignoring the variety of methods of 
social control other than the criminal law available in a modern legal system. 
33. "Sanctions," as used· in this Article, "are imposed by the state presumably 
against, or at least without regard to, the wishes of the individual being deprived." 
Sanctions are thus involuntary in a political, though not necessarily in a psychological 
sense. Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low- Visibility 
Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 544 n.4 ( 1960). 
34. q. Palmer, A Model of Criminal Dispositions, note I supra (discussing the 
role of appellate court value analysis in four problem areas of the criminal law). 
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the inadequacies of the currently employed division of disposi-
tional authority between the courts and the legislatures. 
A. An Interest Analysis of Dispositional Decision Making 
An interest analysis of dispositional decision making requires 
an explicit articulation of the interests or values protected by the 
criminal law. Five broad categories of values may be posited as a 
mode of analysis of the criminal law:35 human life, integrity of 
one's person, private property, "state process," and individual lib-
erty. While the first three values are easily recognizable if one 
asks what interests are served by the substantive offenses of mur-
der, assault, and theft, the other two values, "state process" and 
individual liberty, require further explication. · 
A criminal offense relates to the state process value when the 
determination of criminal liability is based on interferences with 
some legislatively imposed system of social control. The category 
of offenses can include anything from violation of licensing re-
quirements to noncompliance with regulations regarding food 
storage36 or firearm transferY Thus, the value of state process 
underlies the host of criminal offenses labelled "public welfare"38 
or "regulatory" offenses. State process crimes differ from crimes 
such as murder, assault, or theft where the social control goal is to 
regulate directly an actor's conduct towards members of the com-
munity. In contrast, when one examines the gun control legisla-
tion, which in this analysis is a state process crime, it becomes 
evident that state process crimes have distinctive means of deter-
mining criminal liability39 that distinguish them from common 
law crimes. Although some scholars employ the concepts of 
"strict liability" and the "public welfare" when discussing these 
problems,40 the state process category is here employed to illumi-
nate the value choices made in adopting particular standards for 
adjudication and disposition.41 
Whether individual liberty is or ought to be a goal of the 
criminal law has sparked considerable debate.42 Individual lib-
35. Alternatively, it might be said that the criminal law protects three broad in-
terests-security of person, private property, and public welfare. Kadish, The Crisis of 
Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS 157, 158 (1967). 
36. See, e.g., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975). 
37. See, e.g., United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1970). 
38. See generally Sayre, Public We(fare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 55 (1933). 
39. See text accompanying notes 97-102 infra. 
40. See Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REV. 731 
(1960). 
41. See Palmer, A Model of Criminal Dispositions, note I supra (discussing exam-
ples of how the state process value can be used). 
42. See H. PACKER, supra note 13, at 14-16. Professor Packer recognizes that a 
concept of individual liberty or autonomy ought to qualify the interest of the criminal 
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erty is adopted here as an interest or value of equal weight for 
four reasons. First, viewing individual liberty as a goal "serves to 
integrate the substance and process of modern criminal law."43 
That is, the judicially fashioned due process limitations are 
thereby integrated into the overall interest analysis of criminal law 
decision making.44 Second, the criticisms directed at judges, legis-
latures and other officials who give too little or too much weight to 
individual liberty in their decision making can be made more ex-
plicit.45 Third, the individual liberty value performs particular 
functions when an interest analysis is applied to dispositional pol-
icy making. Because individual liberty is necessarily affected by 
any state sanction, the use of any disposition to achieve particular 
social control goals must be justified in terms of the values 
served.46 In addition, the concept of liberty helps one to under-
stand why individuals who are subject to dispositions are entitled 
to certain allocations of dispositional authority.47 Finally, where 
the social control goals of the criminal law are in doubt, a focus on 
the value of individual liberty is a good starting point for develop-
ing dispositional rules. In other words, by employing the individ-
ual liberty interest, it is possible to examine the range of policy 
choices that exist with respect to the substance of criminal sanc-
tions as well as the policy choices presented in sentencing for par-
ticular offenses. 
The analysis could include more categories or subcategories 
if, for example, the interests underlying the offense of rape were 
law in crime prevention, but he does not place individual liberty on an equal footing 
with "the prevention of crime ... the primary purpose of the criminal law." .I d. at 
16. 
One of Packer's most outspoken antagonists suggests that the minimizing of state 
interference with an individual's life ought to be viewed as one of the primary goals of 
criminal law. Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or a Third "Model" if the 
Criminal Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359,367 n.34, 374-75 (1970). 
43. See Palmer, A Model o/ Criminal Dispositions, supra note I, at 9. 
44. At one level, these constitutional limitations on both criminal law adjudica-
tion and disposition are essentially new ways in which individuals who are potentially 
subject to the criminal process can force the legal system to respond to their chal-
lenges. Prior to the criminal law's "constitutionalization," the broad "principle of 
legality" was a means of recognizing the individual's need to challenge the legality of 
state control. Whether or not one agrees with what the courts have done to modern 
criminal law, it should be acknowledged that to include the concept of individual 
liberty as an interest of equal importance makes more explicit the way in which indi-
vidual interests ought to be recognized within the criminal process. See Palmer, A 
Model o/ Criminal Dispositions, supra note I, at 10. 
45. See notes 187-203 & accompanying text infra. 
46. However, the interest of individual liberty as used in dispositional decision 
making is not synonymous with freedom from governmental interference. Still, to 
recognize individual liberty would allow the state to interfere with an individual la-
beled "criminal" only to the extent necessary to achieve social control goals. 
47. That is, the individual has a "right" to have the courts, rather than legisla-
tures and correctional officials deciding some dispositional policy issues. 
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considered.48 Using only the five categories proposed here, rape 
involves the interest of bodily integrity. A full analysis would re-
quire that one consider whether the value of sexual integrity is 
part of the broader value of bodily integrity or a separate value 
promoted in unique ways by the criminallaw.49 However one an-
swers this question, he should be conscious that any categorization 
of values is a heuristic device that will not serve all purposes.50 
The five categories of values proposed, however, are sufficient for 
the purpose of establishing a method of rule making for disposi-
tion. 
B. Gun Control in Massachusetts: The General Preventive 
Function of the Criminal Law 
A much publicized Massachusetts statute requires a 
mandatory one year term of incarceration upon conviction for un-
licensed gun possession.51 The highest court in Massachusetts has 
recently upheld the statutory scheme against several constitutional 
attacks.52 The court rejected the defendant's contentions that the 
statute imposed cruel and unusual punishment,53 violated the 
state separation of powers provisions by infringing on judicial dis-
cretion, 54 and denied the defendant the equal protection of the 
laws under the United States Constitution. 55 The court avoided 
any discussion of the wisdom or efficacy of the particular scheme 
or of the general debate on mandatory sentencing56 and declared 
its institutional incompetence to consider any policy argument 
about what amount of flexibility in the legal system best serves the 
needs of the citizenry. Those policy choices were deemed more 
properly within the province of the legislatureY The court's re-
48. Several state legislatures have recently recharacterized forcible rape as 
merely one type of criminal assault. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West 1976); 
MoNT. REv. CoDES ANN.§ 94-5-503 (Supp. 1977) (criminal sexual assault; but same 
penalties as assault); N.D. CENT. CoDE§ 12.1-20-03 (Supp. 1977). 
49. Deciding whether to change the law of rape to some form of sexual assault 
would require this type of analysis. 
50. For instance, a different type of value analysis should be developed with re-
spect to the functions of a "defense" such as self-defense. Cf. Goldstein & Katz, 
Abolish the "Insanity Difense''-Why Not?, 71 YALE L.J. 853, 856-57 (1963) (sug-
gesting that if a person is allowed to stand his ground and kill in self-defense the law 
is subordinating the value of human life to the value of being free of the feelings of 
cowardice). 
51. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131 & ch. 269, § 10 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 
1978). 
52. Commonwealth v. McQuoid, 344 N.E.2d 179 (Mass. 1976); Commonwealth 
v. Jackson, 344 N.E.2d 166 (Mass. 1976). 
53. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 344 N.E.2d 166, 170-74 (Mass. 1976). 
54. /d. at 176-79. 
55. Commonwealth v. McQuoid, 344 N.E.2d 179, 180-81 (Mass. 1976). 
56. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 344 N.E.2d 166, 169 (Mass. 1976). 
57. /d. at 169-70. 
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sponse is in accord with existing analyses of sentencing issues. 
An interest analysis of the problem before the Massachusetts 
court reveals two aspects of its dispositional decision that are sub--
merged in existing analysis. First, existing analysis does not view 
the legislature's promulgation of the offense as part of an overall 
gun control system that relies heavily on police and administrative 
decision making for its operation. The record in the Massachu-
setts case illustrates that courts are asked to review not only the 
decision of the legislature, but the decisions of police and adminis-
trative officials as well. The "agreed statement of facts" necessary 
to the court's holding reveals that two police officers observed the 
defendant and his companion in "suspicious circumstances." The 
officer discovered a gun in the defendant's possession after appre-
hending him and a companion. The defendant admitted that he 
had neither a license for the weapon nor proper identification as 
required by statute.58 Thus, the most accurate technical descrip·· 
tion of the defendant's offense was carrying a gun without legal 
authorization. 59 
Second, the court failed to acknowledge the competition be-
tween the values of individual liberty and state process. Were a 
court to review only the police encounter with the accused, it 
might have assessed the significant impact of this system of social 
control upon the value of individual liberty. 
Under the proposed analysis, it is apparent that the legisla-
ture had made policy choices about the means of social control 
long before the addition of a mandatory jail term to the statute. 
First, the legislature chose to delegate its authority to a licensing 
agency rather than to prohibit completely the carrying of guns by 
the civilian population.60 Such a delegation to an administrative 
agency constitutes a determination that it is in the community's 
interest to allow some private individuals to have guns. Second, a 
system of regulation, rather than a prohibition of all civilian gun 
use through the criminal law, might have been relied upon as the 
primary means of social control. The theory behind such regula-
tion would be that qualifying the user of guns prevents conduct 
harmful to the community and thereby serves the public interest. 
If the licensing procedures were minimal, nearly every gun owner 
could be expected to comply. Obtaining a gun license would be 
similar to obtaining a driver's license. However, even with the li-
censing of drivers, it should be noted that the legislature has found 
58. ld. at 169. 
59. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 269, § 10 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1979). 
60. q. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149-51 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(suggesting that a legislature has extremely broad discretion in enacting gun control 
measures). 
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it necessary to authorize penalties for those individuals who fail to 
register and obtain a license. 
Were the legislature to use the driver licensing system as a 
model in establishing a gun licensing system, the role of the police 
in apprehending violators would be minimal. The police are cen-
tral to the administration of this particular state process crime, 
however, because of the purpose underlying the statute. While the 
licensing systems for both guns and drivers protect the "public 
safety," the licensing of guns relates directly to the prevention of 
crime. The "unlicensed gun," it is posited, is likely to be used by a 
person in a robbery, assault or murder. Thus, the modern legisla-
ture and society in general rely upon the police as an official in-
strument of crime prevention. The apprehension of one 
unlicensed gun owner is deemed a general crime prevention meas-
ure. 
In reviewing the mandatory jail term, the appellate court 
should have articulated the underlying legislative theory of 
preventing crimes and the role that police perform in the legisla-
tive system of social control. Viewing disposition functionally, the 
appellate court could have demonstrated that judicial review of 
police conduct under these types of statutes should perform two 
functions. First, a reviewing court should articulate the particular 
prevention function of police in accordance with a general theory 
of crime prevention.61 Second, the court should specify the role it 
performs when the general prevention function is made explicit in 
the legislative promulgation of offenses. 
In the United States Supreme Court's opinions on the "stop 
and frisk" situation,62 the Court discussed the role of police in 
administering a gun control statute. The Court did not, however, 
analyze the cases before it in terms of dispositional roles and did 
not engage in an explicit value analysis as proposed here. An 
analysis of these cases in these terms demonstrates how disposi-
tional decision making authority might be allocated among the 
police, legislature, and appellate courts. In what follows, an ex-
amination of these cases will illustrate how the proposed analysis 
integrates constitutional development into overall policy analysis 
for the criminal law. 
l. The Crime Prevention Function of the Police 
In the first "stop and frisk" case, Terry v. Ohio,63 the Supreme 
61. See generally Andenaes, General Prevention-Illusion or Reality?, 43 J. CRIM. 
L.C.&P.S. 176 (1953). 
62. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 
(1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968). 
63. 392 U.S. I (1968). 
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Court upheld the admission of a gun as evidence in Terry's trial 
for carrying a concealed weapon. In approving the officer's deci-
sion to take the gun from Terry's person, the opinion relied heav-
ily upon a detailed analysis of the arresting officer's words and 
actions with respect to Terry and his companions. 
The arresting officer, a plainsclothes detective, observed 
Terry and two others walking back and forth in front of a jewelry 
store. The officer testified that after some period of observation, 
he suspected that the trio were about to rob the jewelry store. The 
officer approached the suspected robbers and, after a mumbled 
exchange of words, frisked all three men for weapons. Since the 
frisk indicated the presence of hard items beneath the outer cloth-
ing of Terry and one of his companions, Chilton, the officer 
searched them for weapons. The third person, Katz, was frisked 
but not searched because there was no indication of a weapon af-
ter the frisk. The officer took the guns from Terry and Chilton 
and arrested the trio. Later, both Terry and Chilton were charged 
with and convicted of carrying a concealed weapon. Upon denial 
of the suppression motion, the case was appealed to the Supreme 
Court.64 
For Chief Justice Warren, the author of the Terry opinion, a 
decision on the suppression motion was the analytical starting 
point for a judicial resolution of the conflict between the citizen's 
right to be free from police intrusion and the necessity that the 
police have decision-making authority to prevent crime.65 The 
first prong of his analysis required that the officer have a "reason-
ably articulable suspicion" that a robbery was about to occur 
before stopping the person.66 In Terry, the police officer's conduct 
met this test because the actions of Terry and his companions 
would lead "a reasonably prudent" police officer to conclude that 
a robbery was about to occur.67 The second prong of the analysis 
required the Court to assess the reasonableness of the scope of the 
search. That the officer did not search Katz, the third member of 
the trio, indicated that the officer went no further than necessary 
to prevent the robbery and to protect himself from the potentially 
dangerous weapons.6s 
64. /d. at 4-5. 
65. /d. at 23-27. 
66. /d. at 20-21. 
67. Possession of a firearm is one indication that a person may be contemplating 
a robbery. Under Chief Justice Warren's analysis, the officer had a duty to prevent 
the robbery. /d. at 23. 
68. /d. at 29-30. This after-the-fact review of what the police officer saw and did 
under the rubric of "reasonableness" bears a close resemblance to the way in which 
the judiciary views the significance of events in common law adjudication. See Wel-
lington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Noles on Ad-
judication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973). See also Palmer, Advocacy, note 13 supra. 
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When the decision in Terry is viewed functionally, two other 
aspects of the decision not mentioned by Warren become appar-
ent.69 First, the Ohio statute with respect to carrying a concealed 
weapon70 serves the same underlying crime prevention purpose as 
the Massachusetts prohibition against carrying an unlicensed 
weapon. The Ohio statute does not include a regulatory licensing 
requirement and thus constitutes a direct legislative delegation of 
a crime prevention role to the police. The officer's decision in 
Terry to place under state control a person about to commit a 
robbery was consistent with the legislative purpose. 
Second, the decision on the suppression motion in Terry is 
equivalent to an adjudication of guilt on the specific charge of car-
rying a concealed weapon. Hence, approving the arresting of-
ficer's conduct in the course of adjudicating Terry's criminal 
liability is an implicit delegation of a dispositional function to the 
police. That is, the Court's approval of the officer's ·decision and 
conduct is ultimately determinative of whether Terry is subject to 
state control. 71 The result in Terry allows the police to exercise 
direct control over individuals to prevent an identifiable commu-
nity harm such as robbery. However, Warren's failure to ac-
knowledge this dispositional function of the police and to 
articulate the values served thereby has caused his Terry analysis 
to engender great confusion. 
Five years later, in Adams v. Williams,72 Justice Rehnquist 
used Warren's stop and frisk analysis to validate a police search of 
a suspect in his car. The patrolman in Adams approached the de-
fendant's car after being told only minutes beforehand by an un-
identified informant that the defendant had both a gun and 
narcotics in his possession. Justice Rehnquist reasoned that when 
69. Admission of the weapon on the charge of carrying a concealed weapon con-
cluded the issue of Terry's guilt. For possession crimes at least, Judge Cardozo's ad-
monition that "the criminal goes free because the constable has blundered" is true. 
People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 582 (1926). To approve the arresting of-
ficer's conduct in the course of adjudicating Terry's liability for carrying a concealed 
weapon was also to approve the legislature's delegation of a crime prevention func-
tion to the police. Since the legislature and the judiciary view the gun as necessary 
evidence, it is necessary that there be a prior police-accused encounter every time this 
particular offense is adjudicated. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U$. 479, 499 
( 1965) (Harlan, J ., concurring). 
70. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.12 (Baldwin 1978). 
71. Were there no statute prohibiting the carrying of a concealed weapon, the 
officer's conclusion that Terry and his companions were "criminals" might have been 
based on a charge of attempted robbery. Even though the charge of "attempted rob-
bery" serves a prevention function, the evidentiary problems of determining Terry's 
"intent" under such a charge would have been considerable. While determining 
standards for "intent" in an attempted robbery charge is one way of protecting indi-
vidual interests in the criminal process, an analysis of the actual conduct of the official 
doing the prevention, the police officer, is a preferable technique. 
72. 407 u.s. 143 (1972). 
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the defendant rolled down the window instead of complying with 
the patrolman's request that he step outside of his car, the patrol-
man was justified in sea,rching for a gun. And since the defendant 
carried the gun precisely where the informant had said it would 
be, the scope of the search was reasonable.73 
Justice Rehnquist's interpretation of Warren's Terry opinion 
to mean that an officer should prevent any crime represents a sig-
nificant shift in judicial analytical emphasis. The focus of the 
Rehnquist analysis is the dangerousness of the criminal rather 
than the conduct of the officer.74 Under this view, since the per-
ceived purpose of Terry was to insure police safety, an officer 
would always be justified in disarming a person he deemed dan-
gerous. The function of the judiciary is thus to allow the police to 
perform a self-defined crime prevention role. No attempt is made 
to resolve the conflict between the values of liberty and state proc·-
ess raised by the citizen-police encounter since the defendant's ar·-
rest is functionally a "conviction." 
Despite its shift in focus from the officer's conduct to the dan-
gerousness of the individual, Rehnquist's analysis is similar to 
Warren's analysis in one important respect: both Rehnquist and 
Warren see the issue of crime prevention two dimensionally as an 
allocation of decision-making authority between the appellate 
courts and the police. In similar fashion, recent treatment of the 
crime prevention function of the police under gun control statutes 
has avoided a full analysis of the problem. Such an analysis 
should be "tripartite." That is, the appellate court would define 
not only its role and the role of the police, but also that of the 
legislature.75 
2. The Legislature's Role in Crime Prevention 
Warren missed an opportunity to develop a tripartite analysis 
of the stop and frisk problem in the companion cases to Terry. 
For example, in Sibron v. New York,76 a case involving a search 
for illegal narcotics, Warren invalidated the search under the 
73. /d. at 148. After the officer found the gun, an arrest for illegal possession of a 
gun was legal. The search for the narcotics was then incidental to this lawful arrest 
for illegal possession of a gun. /d. at 149. 
74. According to Justice Rehnquist, the patrolman, "properly investigating the 
activity of a person who was reported to be carrying narcotics and a concealed 
weapon and who was sitting alone in a car in a high-crime area at 2:15 in the morn-
ing, ... had ample reason to fear for his safety". /d. at 147-48. 
75. A full constitutional analysis of this problem in criminal law should address 
the allocation of decision-making authority to the courts, the police, and the legisla-
ture. q. Palmer, Advocacy, note 13 supra (discussing a constitutional theory that 
includes the role of courts and legislatures in formulating regulations for investiga-
tion). 
76. 392 u.s. 40 (1968). 
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Terry analysis but dismissed the issue of the constitutionality of 
the New York stop and frisk law as "abstract and unproductive" 
even though the litigants had briefed and argued the point. 77 The 
first section of the underlying statute provided procedural stand-
ards for police conduct.78 The second portion defined the circum-
stances under which an officer could search a person for a 
weapon, and when the officer could seize the weapon.79 Why a 
decision about this legislative enactment is "unproductive" in 
light of the significance of the legislation to the police crime pre-
vention function is not made apparent. The assertion here is that 
Warren's failure to address the issue is based on his original for-
mulation of the issues as two dimensional in Terry. 
Warren's analysis in Terry did not consider the role of legis-
lative decision making. In other words, because for Warren the 
problem was solely a matter of allocating decision-making author-
ity between judges and police, a perception of any role for legisla-
tive decision making in Sibron was impossible. Had Warren 
asked what role the legislature grants to police in the administra-
tion of drug offenses, he would have had to decide explicitly 
whether his own determination 9f the police function should take 
precedence over the legislature's definition. so 
In the other companion case to Terry, Peters v. New York, 81 
Warren used a search incident to arrest theory to uphold the ad-
mission into evidence of burglary tools. He reasoned that the of-
77. !d. at 59. 
78. '1. A police officer may stop any person abroad in a public place 
whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about 
to commit a felony or any of the offenses specified in section five hun-
dred fifty-two of this chapter, and may demand of him his name, ad-
dress and an explanation of his actions.' 
/d. at 43 (quoting N.Y. CODE CRtM. PROC. § 180-a) (current version at N.Y. CRIM. 
PRoc. LAW§ 140.50(1) (McKinney Supp. 1978)). Under this section, an officer could 
walk up to Sibron and ask him his name, if narcotics possession is a felony. 
79. '2. When a police officer has stopped a person for questioning pur-
suant to this section and reasonably suspects that he is in danger of life 
or limb, he may search such person for a weapon or any other thing the 
possession of which may constitute a crime, he may take and keep it 
until the completion, of the questioning, at which time he shall either 
return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest such person.' 
/d. at 43-44 (quoting N.Y. CODE CRtM. PROC. § 180-1) (current version at N.Y. CRtM. 
PRoc. LAW§ 140.50(2) (McKinney Supp. 1978)). 
80: If the goal were to control drugs, perhaps Warren would prefer other meth-
ods of police investigation. The more typical methods of drug investigation, the use 
of specialized narcotics agents and the recruitment of informants, has certain advan-
tages for the judiciary. As pointed out in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in 
Sibron, the legislature's general grant of authority to the police could be constitu-
tional and at the same time the evidence could be excluded at trial if detention was 
not necessary to prevent harm to the community or the police officer. 392 U.S. at 70-
74 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
81. /d. at 40 (Peters and Sibron were decided together in one opinion). 
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ficer had probable cause to arrest Peters for attempted burglary 
when the tools were seized. In so doing, Warren created a doctri-
nal absurdity by formulating the nonsensical crime of "attempted 
burglary."82 Under the substantive definition of burglary, "break-
ing and entering with the intent to commit a felony," burglary is 
itself a form of attempt crime.83 If Warren's formulation of at-
tempted burglary is to be taken seriously, he is saying that the 
police officer believed the defendant was attempting to attempt 
larceny or some other felony. 
A functional analysis of the particular crime involved in Pe-
ters avoids the doctrinal absurdity of Warren's analysis. The pur-
pose of a statute prohibiting the possession of burglary tools is to 
prevent burglaries. The theoretical justification for controlling the 
instrumentalities of burglary is similar to the theoretical justifica-
tion for controlling guns. Warren's use of a search incident to ar-
rest analysis in Peters does not take account of the different 
functions that the police perform under various fourth amend-
ment analyses.84 When the police are trying to detect a crime al-
ready committed, the search incident to arrest doctrine is an 
appropriate vehicle for appellate review of police crime detection 
activities. Requiring a search warrant prior to search when an ar-
rest is planned is a further limitation upon the crime detection 
function of the police.85 In Terry, Warren for the first time explic-
itly stated that another judicial doctrine, the reasonable suspicion 
test, would be utilized when the police perform a crime prevention 
function. The combination of the Terry analysis and the search 
incident to arrest analysis is in effect a confusion of two distinct 
functions of the police: crime detection and crime prevention. 86 
If the role of the police in preventing burglary is accepted, the 
particular social control functions of the statute in Peters can be 
understood. Under this analysis, the judiciary could conclude that 
the legislature expects police officers encountering persons with 
82. /d. at 66. 
83. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTI, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 426 (1972). But see 
Taylor v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 253, 233 S.W.2d 306 (1950). 
84. Justice Harlan's concurrence in Peters is a protest against this doctrinal and 
factual analysis. Justice Harlan argued that the "search incident to arrest doctrine," 
was inapplicable to the facts of the case. 392 U.S. at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring). If 
the purpose of the Terry analysis is to protect the officer from harm, the search should 
have been permitted on the ground that there was evidence to justify the officer's 
immediate stop and frisk of the suspect. Under Justice Harlan's analysis, the search 
and seizure are justified by the apprehended harm to the officer. There is no separate 
analysis of the justification for the arrest as required under Chief Justice Warren's 
"search incident to arrest" analysis. 392 U.S. at 77-79 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
85. q Chime! v. California, 295 U.S. 752 ( 1969) (warrantless search of suspect's 
house held not justified as incident to arrest). 
86. See generally Adams v. Williamson, 407 U.S. 143, 153-62 (1972) (Marshall, 
J ., dissenting). 
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guns or burglary tools to sanction those individuals. As with the 
gun control statute, here the judicial standards for reviewing po-
lice conduct seek primarily to insure that there is sufficient evi-
dence to justify judicial approval of police conduct in their 
performance of the crime prevention function. 87 
More generally, Warren's analysis obscures the variable rela-
tionship between the police crime prevention function and the 
substance of the offense. Although Terry, St'bron, and Peters all 
involve defendants found guilty of possession offenses, the role 
given police in administering sanctions under each of the statutes 
derives from different values. An appellate court reviewing police 
conduct under these statutes should acknowledge the distinct leg-
islative purposes in sanctioning the carrying of weapons, the pos-
session of drugs, and the possession of burglary tools. The best 
way to see how the crime prevention function of police varies with 
the offense is to analyze the three cases in terms of the particular 
values upheld by the decisions. 
3. An Interest Analysis of Crime Prevention 
The value of individual liberty is at issue in the Peters; Sibron, 
and Terry cases since each involves a possession crime. 88 The val-
ues of private property and, secondarily, bodily security are pro-
moted by laws prohibiting robbery. Similarly, the value of private 
property is protected by a law prohibiting burglary. Control of 
the instruments-themselves as a means of protecting private prop-
erty is legitimate as long as other competing values, individual lib-
erty and bodily security (here, the bodily security of a person who 
also happens to perform the function of police officer),89 are not 
compromised excessively. 
In effect, were Sibron's adjudication and disposition upheld, 
he would be subject to state control solely to uphold the state 
process. In contrast, Peters' and Terry's convictions uphold the 
values of property and bodily security as well as the value of state 
process. Thus, Terry and Peters are two cases in which the appel-
late court implicity agreed that the appropriate value balance is 
87. SeeM. KADISH & S. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY 37-94 (1973) (exam-
ining the use of roles in analyzing problems of discretion). 
88. See, e.g., Allen v. County Court, Ulster County, 568 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(holding facially unconstitutional a New York statute stating that the presence of a 
gun in a car constitutes presumptive evidence of its possession by the car's occupants), 
cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 75 ( 1978). 
89. Notice that here one is not confronted with a situation in which an "inno-
cent" civilian is carrying a gun in Massachusetts for "self-protection" and police ar-
rest discretion is used to avoid bringing this "innocent" person into the process. See 
Beha, "And Nobody Can Get You Out':· The Impact of a Mandatory Prison Sentence 
for the Illegal Carrying of a Firearm on the Use of Firearms and on the Administration 
if Criminal Justice in Boston (pt. 2), 57 B.U.L. REV. 289, 299-300 (1977). 
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maintained under the legislatively authorized method of social 
control-prohibiting possession of the instrumentalities of crime. 
For a court to determine what balance is appropriate is to assume 
a policy-making role. Thus, to inquire whether the Terry analysis 
is to be applied to mere possession offenses is to ask whether the 
judiciary should limit the legislature's ability to delegate a crime 
prevention function to the police.90 
Under existing stop and frisk case law, there are essentially 
two ways of viewing the crime prevention function of the police. 
Under the view espoused by Mr. Justice Warren, the crime pre-
vention function of the police is limited by the judiciary's implicit 
definition of the types of societal harm that justify police intru-
sions upon individual liberty. The results in Terry, St'bron, and 
Peters indicate that the types of harms police can prevent are 
closely related to common law crimes. Police intrusions to pre-
vent a robbery or burglary were consistent with their crime pre-
vention duty under Terry and Peters, but an effort to prevent drug 
possession was viewed as inconsistent with that duty in Sib ron. 
Narrowly defining "harm" in terms of common-law crimes allows 
the judiciary to evaluate an officer's testimony under the judicial 
standards of proof of common law crimes. The purpose of the 
evaluation is to determine whether there indeed exists the feared 
societal harm. While possession crimes underlay the convictions 
in Peters and Terry, the real purpose of the approved police con-
duct was the prevention of a particular robbery or burglary. The 
judicial role under this view is to provide guidelines on a case-by-
case basis that confine the police crime prevention function within 
a common law based definition of harm. By so doing, the judici-
ary is evaluating and defining the dispositional role of the police. 
On the other hand, Mr. Justice Rehnquist sees the crime pre-
vention function of the police essentially as one of controlling 
dangerous persons. Under this view, the judiciary is more con-
cerned with ascertaining whether there is sufficient evidence of in-
dividual dangerousness than with regulating police conduct. 
Thus, the modern police force has the authority to control danger-
ous individuals unless, while obtaining custody of the individual, 
there is a violation of some previously promulgated procedural 
rule. 
The assertion here is that a recognition of the crime preven-
tion function of the police requires the judiciary to establish a gen-
90. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice 
Brennan quoted Judge Friendly's dissent in the Court of Appeals below: "I have the 
gravest hesitancy in extending (Terry v. Ohto) to crimes like the possession of narcot-
ics . . . . There is too much danger that, instead of the stop being the object and the 
protective frisk an incident thereto, the reverse will be true." 407 U.S. at 151. 
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eral dispositional theory. Such a theory should first articulate the 
legislative role in creating the police crime prevention function. 
As suggested above, the legislative promulgation of the prohibi-
tions against the possession of certain items or instrumentalities 
implicitly creates a police crime prevention function. Then, in 
monitoring the operation of these legislative crime prevention 
measures, the judiciary must choose a theory of prevention. The 
position taken in this Article is that the judiciary should choose an 
approach that seeks to limit the crime prevention role of the po-
lice. Such an approach would preserve existing case law that 
seeks to insure the safety of the police officer, but would be critical 
of cases that allow the police too broad a crime prevention role. 
This analysis would recognize that the initial police-citizen en-
counter under a gun control statute is at least as significant, in 
terms of dispositional consequences, as the sanction imposed after 
formal adjudication. A better method of judicial analysis would 
acknowledge the interrelationship among the methods of crime 
prevention, adjudication, and disposition in gun control legisla-
tion. 
C. Drug Use and Abuse: The Criminal and Civil Law as Means 
of Crime Prevention 
In a series of controversial modifications of its penal and cor-
rectional laws, the New York Legislature established mandatory 
sentences for drug trafficking. The legislators first reclassified the 
offenses prohibiting the selling or possession of certain amounts of 
drugs, such as heroin and cocaine. As a result of this reclassifica-
tion, illegal drug possession and selling were crimes with long 
mandatory minimum periods of confinement.91 In addition, nar-
cotics offenses could not be reduced by the process of plea negoti-
ation.92 Lastly, narcotics offenders became ineligible for 
unconditional discharge from their sentences.93 A narcotics of-
fender released prior to the end of his prison term was subject to 
parole supervision for the remainder of his life. 
These legislative reforms, collectively known as the "Rocke-
feller Drug Law," were recently sustained by New York's highest 
court.94 In an opinion consolidating the appeal of eight different 
cases, the court rejected the claim that the sentences were "grossly 
disproportionate" when compared with sentences imposed for 
91. The impact of New York's Drug Law is analyzed in NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF 
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE NATION'S TOUGHEST DRUG LAW: 
EVALUATING THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE, fiNAL REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMIT-
TEE ON NEW YORK DRUG LAW EVALUATION 3-6 (1978). 
92. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 220.10 (McKinney Supp. 1978). 
93. N.Y. CoRREC. LAw§ 212(8) (Consol. 1977) (repealed 1977). 
94. People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100,332 N.E.2d 338,371 N.Y.S.2d 471 (1975). 
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other offenses.95 The court acknowledged that the wisdom of the 
legislative decisions to increase the gravity of drug offenses and 
reduce discretionary decision making in handling narcotics of-
fenders was highly debatable. Like the Massachusetts court, how-
ever, the New York court saw its role as requiring it to accept the 
legislature's conclusions about the gravity of the offenses and the 
penological purposes served by the reforms. The court felt com-
pelled to hold that subjecting drug sellers and possessors to penal-
ties commensurate with those imposed for murder, kidnapping, 
and arson was "reasonable" and thus constitutional. 96 
The court justified its decision by relying on legislative re-
ports that supported the proposition that drug penalties prevent 
collateral crimes such as robberies and burglaries.97 The more 
general crime prevention purpose attributed to legislatively deter-
mined drug offenses, however, is a mere label that hinders a full 
analysis of the competing interests. The court should have used 
an interest analysis to articulate what particular values are served 
by these statutes before concurring in the legislative judgment 
about the similarity of murder to the drug offenses. 
Making murder a crime upholds the value of human life; and 
creating penalties for kidnapping and arson upholds the values of 
bodily integrity and private property.98 Promulgating the drug of-
fenses might be thought to uphold the value of health; but as 
structured, these criminal offenses protect the value of state proc-
ess.99 The New York court assumed that all three values are 
treated similarly by the criminal law. However, the contention 
here is that the criminal law does not and ought not treat these 
values in the same fashion. 100 The court should have analyzed the 
complex manner in which these drug offenses-"controlled sub-
stances offenses" -protect the state process and health values. 
In order to perform an interest analysis of drug offenses, a 
court would have to examine the variety of ways in which the le-
gal system deals with drugs. For example, an individual may ob-· 
95. /d. at 110, 332 N.E.2d at 341, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 475. See also Carmona v. 
Ward, 576 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that mandatory sentences of life impris-
onment imposed on defendants under the Rockefeller Drug Law were not so grossly 
disproportionate to the nature of their offenses as to constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 874 ( 1979). 
96. People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 115-18, 332 N.E.2d 338, 344-46, 371 
N.Y.S.2d 471. 479-81 (1975). 
97. !d. at 113, 332 N.E.2d at 343, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 477. 
98. C.f. id. at 115-17, 332 N.E.2d at 344-46, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 479-81 (comparing 
the punishment for drug offenses with the punishment for other felonies). 
99. See, e.g., New York Controlled Substances Act, N.Y. Pus. HEALTH LAW 
§§ 3300-3397 (McKinney 1977). Section 3301(a) provides that "this article shall gov-
ern and control the possession, manufacture, dispensing, administering, and distribu-
tion of controlled substances .... " 
100. See notes 102-40 & accompanying text in.fra. 
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tain a drug at the supermarket to relieve his self-diagnosed 
ailment without direct interference from the legal system. In con-
trast, an "addict" may be subject to involuntary civil commitment 
to cure him of his "affliction." A complex system of state and fed-
eral regulations is designed to assure the patient's access to neces-
sary drugs, yet the use and the distribution of drugs outside this 
regulatory scheme are crimes. 101 
The New York court's analysis thus fails to acknowledge that 
a criminal disposition is only one of a variety of means of control-
ling drugs in our society. Furthermore, the court's analysis does 
not take account of the growing controversy with respect to both 
the practice of regulating drugs to promote health and the effects 
of using the criminal law to control drug use. 102 Before concur-
ring in a legislative judgment that a mandatory sentence for drug 
trafficking prevents collateral crimes, a court should analyze its 
role in allocating the prevention function within the legal system: 
it should articulate the precise role of the criminal law in this va-
ried system of control over drug use. Such an endeavor would 
require an analysis of the adjudicative and dispositive processes in 
the area of drug abuse. 
1. Criminal Liability for Drug Abuse: A Medical Model of 
Social Control 
In Robinson v. Ca!!fornia, 103 for the first time, the Supreme 
Court addressed the application of the eighth amendment to the 
problem of drug abuse control statutes. An analysis of Robinson 
illustrates how medical knowledge and perspectives can shape le-
gal approaches to the imposition of social control over drug abuse. 
In holding that it is unconstitutional to inflict "punishment" on a 
person afflicted with the "illness" of narcotic addiction, the Court 
initiated a full-fledged debate about the social control role of the 
criminal law over drug-related offenses. That debate involves var-
ious perspectives on the proper relationship of criminal liability 
for drug offenses to the particular form of disposition authorized 
for drug abusers.I04 
Two points about Robinson are essential for a full under-
101. Thus the statute specifically upholds the value of "state process"-the admin-
istrative process of regulating drug use----<iesigned to protect the community's health. 
102. See H. PACKER, note 13 supra. Moreover, many state legislatures recently 
have reduced certain drug related penalties in an attempt to decriminalize some drug 
offenses. See, e.g., New York Marijuana Reform Act of 1977, N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 221.05 (McKinney Supp. 1978). See also State v. Ward, 57 N.J. 75, 82-83, 270 A.2d 
I, 5 ( 1970) (suggesting that first offenders in marijuana possession cases should receive 
suspended sentences). 
103: 370 u.s. 660 (1962). 
104. The full ramifications of this particular debate for eighth amendment juris-
prudence will not be explored here. 
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standing of the dispositional policy issues courts must confront in 
the drug abuse area. First, the precise holding of Justice Stewart's 
opinion in Robinson is unclear and remains the subject of contro-
versy.105 It is difficult to determine whether Stewart meant that 
the state could not use the criminal adjudicative process to label 
the "sick" addict a criminal or that it could not use a criminal 
disposition for the addict. 106 Indeed, Robinson has been used to 
stand for both propositions in subsequent cases. 
In Powell v. Texas, 107 a case dealing with the nexus of "dis-
ease" and criminal liability, Justice Marshall held that a person 
afflicted with the disease of "chronic alcoholism" constitutionally 
could be convicted of the crime of public drunkenness. For Mar-
shall, Robinson stood only for the proposition that to attach crimi-
nality to the mere "status" of being an addict or being sick was 
unconstitutional. Hence, it is not cruel and unusual punishment 
to hold a person criminally accountable for "voluntarily" going 
into a public place while intoxicated. 108 In other words, Robinson 
was a constitutional limitation on criminal adjudication rather 
than a limitation on disposition. 109 In contrast, Justice Stewart's 
use of Robinson in his series of death penalty opinions indicates 
that he was in fact concerned about dispositions. 110 Thus, it was 
the criminal form of disposition under Stewart's view that was im-
permissible under the eighth amendment. 111 
The second point to be recognized about Robinson is that the 
controversy over the holding is a reflection of a larger controversy 
about the role of the criminal process in drug abuse generally. In 
Robinson, Stewart and other justices disagreed over whether a 
"medical model" 112 of control ought to be used for drug abuse. 
The Stewart analysis exemplifies the medical model of social con·· 
trol. 
Robinson was decided in an era when the rehabilitative ideal 
105. See, e.g., Fingarette, Addiction and Criminal Responsibtlity, 84 YALE L.J. 413 
( 1975). 
106. See Palmer, A Model of Criminal Dispositions, supra note I, at 8. 
107. 392 U.S. 514 (1968). 
108. /d. at 532-34. 
109. Justice White's concurrence in Powell went even further in suggesting that 
Robinson was a constitutional limitation on all forms of adjudication. /d. at 548-49. 
Although other justices still treat Robinson as a limitation on adjudication, Justice 
White's recent death penalty dissents are particularly noteworthy examples of that 
view. See, e.g., Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 350-56 (1976) (White, J., dissent-
ing); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,306-07 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). 
110. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 172 (1976). 
Ill. Under such a view of the meaning of the eighth amendment, Justice Stewart's 
decision gave constitutional approval to involuntary civil confinement of addicts in a 
case in which that issue was not before the court. 
112. See text accompanying notes 117-19 infra (defining the medical model). 
1979] MANDATORY SENTENCING SCHEMES 777 
dominated scholarly and public discussion of criminal process 113 
and of drug abuse in particular. In contrast to the goals of the 
present era, reform and rehabilitation of the ordinary criminal of-
fender by experts was thought to be the only justifiable purpose of 
imposing state control. 114 Avoiding the stigma and degradation of 
jail or prison was the first step in fundamental reform of the entire 
criminal process. 115 In this philosophical atmosphere, even one 
day in jail for the presumably "sick" addict would be abhor-
rent.l16 
Hence, Stewart's view recognizes the legitimate need for the 
control of drug abuse but prefers a medical method of controlling 
individuals to a criminal method of control: 117 an involuntary 
civil commitment designed to cure the addict of his affliction is 
more palatable than a criminal disposition.l 18 Thus, Stewart's 
constitutional analysis permitted the legislature to use the criminal 
law to impose sanctions on the manufacture, distribution, and 
possession of drugs, but not the disease of "addiction." 119 
Judges and legislatures have never fully embraced the medi-
cal model as the general method of social control for the criminal 
law.l 20 However, most legal policy makers acknowledge the im-
portance of medical and scientific decision making in devising a 
system of criminal liability for drug abuse. For instance, Justice 
Clark's Robinson dissent is based on his disagreement with Justice 
Stewart over the proper legal interpretation of the term "addicted" 
113. See Allen, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Idea/, in THE BoRDERLAND OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 25 (1964). 
114. But see Andenaes, The Genera/ Preventive Effects o/ Punishment, 114 U. P A. 
L. REV. 949, 973-74 (1966). 
115. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 668 (1962) (Douglas, J., con-
curring). During the course of his opinion, Justice Douglas discusses the changing 
methods of dealing with the "insane." !d. at 668-69. He intimates that civil commit-
ment is a preferred method of dealing with "addicts," id. at 677, and rejects criminal 
prosecutions for addicts by asserting: "This age of enlightenment cannot tolerate such 
a barbarous action," id. at 678. 
116. In Robinson, Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, concluded that 
a State law which imprisons a person [afflicted with the illness of nar-
cotic addiction], even though he has never touched any narcotic drug 
within the State or been guilty of any irregular behavior there, inflicts a 
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. To be sure, imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a 
punishment which is either cruel or unusual. But the question cannot 
be considered in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a cruel 
and unusual punishment for a "crime" of having a common cold. 
370 U.S. at 667. 
117. Seeid. at 668 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
118. /d. at 665. 
119. /d. at 664-67. 
120. See, e.g., lnreFoss, 10 Cal. 3d 910,933-38,519 P.2d 1073, 1088-91, 112 Cal. 
Rptr. 649, 663-66 (1972) (Clark, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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in the California Health and Safety Code. 121 Under Clark's inter-
pretation, the defendant Robinson was a "voluntary addict," that 
is, a person just starting to use the prohibited drug. When the 
person became unable to control his craving for the drug, he be-
came an "involuntary addict" amenable to civil commitment. In 
Clark's view there was nothing unconstitutional about using a 
ninety day jail term with two years of parole supervision as a 
method of controlling a "voluntary" addict. 122 
Stewart failed to perceive Clark's distinction because, in 
Stewart's view, all addicts are assumed to be physiologically and 
thus medically addicted. Even though their discussions of what 
the legislature meant by addiction differed, both their analyses re-
quire some background scientific knowledge or assumptions about 
the effects of particular drugs upon human beings. Determina-
tions of these effects are made by medical investigators and practi-
tioners in our society. Hence, the issue is not, for example, 
whether all legal decisions should now be made on the assumption 
that newer information relating drug addiction to peer social in-
fluence is correct. 123 Rather, when analyzing a problem of crimi-
nal liability for drug abuse, the issue is the extent to which 
medical or scientific decision making should influence legal deci-
sion making. 
Were an appellate court to confront the appropriateness of a 
"medical model" for determining individual liability for drug use, 
it would necessarily consider a series of questions about the social 
institutions utilized to facilitate and control drug use. First, the 
court would ask itself: in what ways does the law view the medical 
process as a system of social control? In formulating an answer, 
the court should acknowledge that in some circumstances the law, 
or at least judges, have demonstrated a certain ambivalence in 
delegating delicate social value judgements to medical profession-
als.124 Second, and more specifically, in the area of drug use, the 
121. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 679-85 (1962) (Clark, J., dissenting) 
(discussing former CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE § 11721 (enacted as ch. 1079, 1939 
Cal. Stats. 3003)). 
122. /d. at 681-84. 
123. Subsequent research, for example, has demonstrated that Stewart's assump-
tions about the physiological basis of heroin addiction were unwarranted. See J. 
WILSON, supra note 31, at 128-33. 
124. See, e.g., In re Dinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d 134, 134 (Mass. App. 1978) ("[A] 
physician attending an incompetent, terminally ill patient may lawfully direct that 
resuscitation measures be withheld in the event of cardiac or respiratory arrest where 
such a direction has not been approved in advance by a Probate Court"). C.f. In re 
Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (court hesitant to 
delegate facially similar human value decisions to physicians). "Determinations as to 
these must, in the ultimate, be responsive not only to the concepts of medicine but 
also to the common moral judgment of the community at large. In the latter respect, 
the Court has a non-delegable judicial responsibility." /d. at 44, 355 A.2d at 665. 
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court should ask itself: What role does the medical profession play 
in preventing drug abuse in the society? In formulating an answer 
to that question, a court should note that the legislative method of 
controlling drugs is dependent upon doctors' adherence to strict 
medical standards when giving drugs to "patients." 125 Thus, the 
exercise of medical discretion is generally a key element in the 
legislative design of social control systems for drug use. 
Drugs have been characterized as the "key to modern 
medicine"; 126 and medication is the preferred mode of treatment 
for a host of medical problems. Because of this societal esteem, 
we often fail to acknowledge that "overruse, abuse and misuse" of 
drugs constitute a major health problem in the United States. 127 
Ambivalence about the role of medical professions in the social 
control of drug use in our society, therefore, is not explicit. 
Drugs are thus a mixed blessing in that they are necessary for 
modern medical treatment and yet are potentially hazardous. 
This mixed blessing aspect is reflected in several ways in our laws 
regulating drug use. First, the typical criminal drug statute regu-
lates how the drugs can be dispensed. This regulatory scheme is 
designed to insure that patients are able, for instance, to obtain 
needed prescription drugs. This facilitates the use of drugs in cur-
ing medically defined illnesses. It should be noted, however, that 
some drugs, such as heroin, have been legislatively declared to 
have no accepted medical use. 128 One might ask for the scientific 
or medical justifications for such a classification. The answer 
from a scientific point of view is probably "none." However, the 
answer in terms of helping society deal with the health threat of 
drugs is more complex. 
By prohibiting some drugs, society assures itself that health 
risks are minimized and medicinal benefits are maintained. This 
is not to suggest that the preceding effect follows from eliminating 
heroin use in society. Rather, the legislative scheme puts the soci-
etal imprimatur on what are the safe as opposed to the unsafe 
drugs. 
A court analyzing the role of the medical profession under 
criminal drug statutes could articulate the values underlying those 
The court's ambivalence was expressed in the closing sentence of its opinion: "[W]e 
do not intend to be understood as implying that a proceeding for judicial declaratory 
relief is necessarily required for the implementation of comparable decisions in the 
field of medical practice." /d. at 55, 355 A.2d at 672. 
125. A typical drug statute prohibits use unless the drug is administered by a per-
son licensed to do so, such as a physician. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE 
§ 11550 (West Supp. 1979). 
126. V. fUCHS, WHO SHALL LIVE? HEALTH, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICE 
104 (1975). 
127. /d. at 119. 
128. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(l)(B) (1976). 
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statutes that require proof of drug use without medical or state 
administrative approval. In fact, a typical drug abuse statute in-
cludes a provision prohibiting use "unless authorized by law" or 
"administered by a person licensed by the state. board." 129 Thus, 
the statutes as structured uphold the value of the state process. 
While it is already the defendant's burden to prove lawful use, 
statutes also generally use presumptions to ease both the prosecu-
tor's burden of producing evidence and his burden of persuasion 
at trial. 130 
A court evaluating the medical model could then address the 
legislative schemes mandating involuntary (or voluntary, if that is 
truly possible) commitment for certain forms of drug abuse 131 as 
part of this system of state regulation. The legislatures sometimes 
explicitly allow an individual to be removed from the criminal 
process after adjudication and to be placed in the civil process 
instead. 132 At other times, before adjudication, judges without 
legislative authorization allow individuals to be shifted out of the 
criminal process through pretrial diversion. 133 
Perceiving the melange of social control mechanisms within 
the law, a court could put into perspective the often exaggerated 
and confused community responses to drug use and abuse. For 
example, the present intellectual atmosphere is one of disillusion-
ment with the prospect of rehabilitating any offender, and particu-
larly drug offenders, through the legal process. Some scholars 
now suggest that confronting the public policy issues surrounding 
heroin use requires an acknowledgement of the general lack of 
understanding of drug abuse in society. 134 In contrast, the politi-
cal atmosphere that leads legislatures to call drug abuse a "grave 
offense" is fed by the image of a drug-driven individual robbing to 
obtain money to purchase illegal drugs. The drug-driven robber 
is perceived as being more in need of social control than the mere 
robber. More social control is thought necessary because the 
129. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 11550 (West Supp. 1979). 
130. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw§ 220.25 (McKinney Supp. 1978). 
131. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL Hvo. LAw§§ 23.01-.29 (McKinney 1978); N.Y. PE-
NAL LAw§ 60.03 (McKinney 1975). 
132. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CoDE§§ 3050-3059 (West 1972 & Supp. 1979); 
if. In re De La 0, 59 Cal. 2d 128, 378 P.2d 793, 28 Cal. Rptr. 489 ( 1963) (statute 
providing for suspension of criminal proceedings and confinement for treatment of 
narcotics addiction held not to impose cruel and unusual punishment and was not 
intended to be a penal sanction when enacted by the legislature). 
133. See, e.g., State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85, 363 A.2d 321 (1976); if. People v. 
Reed, 112 Cal. Rptr. 493 (2d Dist. 1974), vacated, 46 Cal. App. 3d 625, 120 Cal. Rptr. 
250 (2d Dist. 1975) (post-trial diversion by trial judge; later vacated because statute 
only allowed diversion prior to trial). 
134. See generally J. WILSON, supra note 31, at 125-59. 
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drug-driven robber has acted in contradiction to two social control 
systems, the legal and the medical. 
Additionally it would be recognized that the social control 
potential of medical programs, such as methodone maintenance, 
has been exaggerated. Having given the "patient-robber" a new 
drug, "methadone," policy makers are discovering that he has not 
been "cured" of his propensity to rob. 135 Under these circum-
stances, a court should point out that the medical model's image 
of a drug-driven robber reflects conflicting goals. Unfortunately, 
the need to "help and cure" the patient-criminal obscures the ad-
ditional need that he be controlled and punished. 136 
A legislature might attempt to implement the previous analy-
sis and clarify the social control goals by redefining statutory 
crimes. For example, a legislature could provide that anyone 
found under the influence of an illicit drug when committing rob-
bery would receive a mandatory sentence. Instead of a statute au-
thorizing judges to order a medical examination to determine the 
defendant's need for care and custody, 137 a different kind of statu-
tory provision would be needed. Such a statute would require a 
medical examination of the accused prior to trial to see if the pros-
ecutor has sufficient evidence to elevate the charge of robbery to 
"drug-related robbery."I3s 
Note, however, that even to state the bare outline of the statu-
tory scheme raises a constitutional question. The accused robber's 
right not to be used as a source of evidence in the adjudication of 
his guilt is possibly violated by the proposed statute. One purpose 
of the statute might be to allow the prosecutor to meet his burden 
of proof at adjudication.l 39 Were the proposed statut~ enacted, 
society would be left with the choice of either modifying 'standards 
of proof when scientific evidence is used to define substantive 
crimes or compelling the accused to be used as a source of evi-
dence. 
In raising the constitutional question, one merely adopts the 
135. Jd. at 154. 
136. Cf Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the Insanity Difense-Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 
853, 868-70 (1963) (noting that desires for retribution against the "sick" law-breaker 
are masked by more socially acceptable ideas favoring "treating the sick"). 
137. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL Hva. LAW§§ 23.07, .09 (McKinney 1978). 
138. Some legislatures have authorized mandatory sentences if an offense is com-
mitted with a firearm. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§§ 53a-35(c)(2),-134 (West 
Supp. 1978). The proposed drug related robbery statute builds upon this legislative 
model. 
139. To meet the constitutional standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, see 
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), a legislature would have to authorize the 
admission of the evidence obtained in the mandated examination. 
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existing perspective of appellate courts on the social control poli·· 
cies proposed. In adopting this perspective, one should be aware 
that society is not prepared to make determinative policy choices. 
The social utility of drugs may well be increasing-that is, congru .. 
ent with notions of how to promote "health" as a value, society 
may need more drugs, not less. The "drug-related robbery" stat-
ute would make the ambivalence about the social utility of drug 
use more visible. 
For good reasons, society has not formally altered its basic 
methods of adjudicating and disposing of drug offenders. First, to 
adopt the proposed statute allowing preadjudicative examination 
of the offender would require one to treat the medical knowledge 
that is the foundation of the statutory scheme as if it were funda-
mentally valid and indisputable. Although this conforms to the 
lay view of medical science, medical knowledge is derived from a 
process of clinical experience and reasoning that is essentially dy-
namic. A particular drug is an appropriate treatment because of 
clinical tests demonstrating its effectiveness. Subsequent tests may 
indicate that its side effects are so serious that the drug should no 
longer be prescribed. 140 To base the entire criminal process for 
drug abusers on a premise which is as dynamic as medical knowl-
edge would make the criminal process appear uncertain and tran-
sient. In particular, if the presumed causal relationship between 
crime and drugs is disproved, or at least recognized to change over 
time with further research and clinical experience, the justification 
for employing criminal means to regulate drug abuse would be 
open to serious doubt. 
Second, and more importantly, ignoring doubts about the na-
ture of criminal liability for drug offenses allows existing invisible 
methods of control to operate without question. The present drug 
control system is at variance with the basic principle of criminal 
law that courts are the primary arbiters of criminal liability. An 
ambivalence about the appropriate methods for controlling drugs 
has led to a shift in decision making authority from courts to other 
officials; and prosecutors have been the primary recipients of this 
redistribution of authority. 
140. The recent controversy over diethylstilbestrol (DES) illustrates the point. 
DES is a man-made estrogen that has many medical uses. For a period of 25 years 
DES was prescribed to prevent miscarriages in pregnant women. Subsequent re-
search, however, indicated that use of DES during pregnancy increased the risk of 
cancer in the user's daughters. As a result, in 1971, the Food and Drug Administra-
tion banned the use of DES for pregnant women. See Comment, DES and a Pro-
posed Theory o.f Enterprise Liabilit.)', 46 FoRDHAM L. REv. 963 (1978) (discussing 
some of the legal issues surrounding DES). 
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2. Prosecutors as Social Control Agents: An Inquisitorial 
Theme in the American Criminal Process 141 
783 
In theory, the American prosecutor's obligation is to present 
vigorously the community's case against its adversary, the crimi-
nal defendant in an accusatory criminal process. Since the prose-
cutor is elected for a short term, the local community, or "client," 
can "fire" him through the electoral process whenever his per-
formance is deemed unsatisfactory. The American prosecutor, 
then, is generally a practicing lawyer serving as the community's 
advocate. 142 
In contrast, the typical European prosecutor is an appointed 
or career official having closer ties with the courts and the central 
government in what may be called an inquisitorial criminal proc-
ess.143 The Continental prosecutor's role is to pursue the "public 
interest," and not simply to represent the community in a lawsuit. 
As an arm of the court and central government, he is not even 
considered a member of the practicing bar. 144 As a public servant, 
the inquisitorial prosecutor takes an active part in the investiga-
141. The subtitle for this section is taken from Goldstein, Rtjlections on Two 
Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American Criminal Procedures, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1009 
(1974). In the course of developing his basic thesis that the development of American 
criminal procedure has been influenced by concepts and practices from the European 
inquisitorial systems of criminal procedures, Professor Goldstein suggests that 
regulatory offenses create pressures for inquisitorial procedures. He states: 
It was probably inevitable that American criminal procedure 
would become less accusatorial as government became more complex 
and criminal law was used more often as an instrument of social policy. 
Many of the new regulatory offenses could not be enforced if exclusive 
reliance were placed, in accordance with accusatorial theory, upon 
those who were wronged. In some instances, this is because victims 
lack the resources or self-assurance to litigate or because there are not 
victims in the usual sense. Such "victimless" crimes include gambling, 
narcotics, and sex offenses, where the criminal law has been used to 
control conduct engaged in consensually. To enforce this new body of 
regulatory criminal laws and to cope with the increase in the older 
crimes against property and person as America became more industrial 
and urban, police forces grew and prosecuting attorneys expanded their 
activities. The criminal sanction became only one among a range of 
devices~riminal, administrative, injunctive, and monetary-for 
controlling conduct. 
/d. at 1021. 
While Professor Goldstein does not specifically point to changes in the prosecu-
tor's role as an example of an "inquistorial theme" in American criminal procedure, 
see, e.g., id. at 1022-25, I believe the analysis presented in this section is consistent 
with his overall analysis. 
142. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DE-
FENSE FUNCTION 17-19 ( 1970). 
143. Even the English Director of Public Prosecutions is a career official and a 
subordinate of the cabinet minister. /d. at 17. Thus, the English prosecutor responds 
to different institutional forces than does the American prosecutor. 
144. For example, the Continental prosecutor would not generally be expected to 
participate in a bar association meeting. /d. at 17. 
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tion and adjudication of crimes and the disposition of criminals: 
both identifying the innocent and seeking punishment for the 
guilty.l45 
In practice, the American prosecutor plays a dominant role in 
all phases of drug enforcement (much like a Continental prosecu-
tor). First, in contrast to their role in other types of offenses, pros-
ecutors supervise the investigative agents involved in drug abuse 
detection and control. For example, a prosecutor decides whether 
information gathered from an accused drug abuser should be used 
to obtain a search warrant against another accused drug abuser. It 
is the prosecutor who is required by law to seek judicial authoriza-
tion for a wire-tap to "break up a drug ring." 146 
Besides supervising the investigation of drug offenses, the 
American prosecutor has an important policy-making role in de-
ciding who will be adjudged guilty of narcotics crimes. The prose-
cutor decides how the information gathered by specialized 
narcotics agents is to be used; for example, whether the informa-
tion gathered from informants will be used in the prosecution of a 
particular drug trafficker. 147 By law, the prosecutor is required to 
decide who among several candidates will be granted immunity in 
exchange for testimony against a fellow offender. And, without 
explicit legislative authorization, it is the prosecutor who must ap·-
prove any "plea bargains" arranged by narcotics agents with of-
fenders who desire to become informants. 
As far as the ultimate disposition of offenders is concerned, it 
is the prosecutor who must decide whether to charge individuals 
with offenses carrying mandatory prison sentences. 148 Until quite 
recently, prosecutors had complete discretion to refuse an accused 
drug offender's request for disposition outside of the criminal 
145. In theory, the Continental prosecutor has no discretion not to prosecute for 
major crimes. See Jescheck, The Discretionary Power of the Prosecuting Allorney in 
West Germany, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 508 (1970). Considerable controversy has devel-
oped over whether the Continental prosecutor exercises wider discretion in practice: 
than the theory of his role would suggest. Compare Goldstein & Marcus, The Myth of 
Judicial Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial" Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 
YALE L.J. 240 (1977) (suggesting that empirical studies ofthe three European systems 
reveal that prpsecutors have considerably more discretion than many Americans have 
been led to believe) with Langbein & Weinreb, Continental Criminal Procedure: 
"Myth" and Reality, 87 YALE L.J. 1549 (1978) (disputing the claims of Professor 
Goldstein and Mr. Marcus). 
146. See, (!.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 700.05(5), .05(8)(c), .10(1) (McKinney 
1971 & Supp: 1978). 
147. See~. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 136 (1966). 
148. See Note, Drug Abuse, Law Abuse, and the Eighth Amendment: New Yorks 
1973 Drug Legislation and the Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 60 
CORNELL L. REV. 638,662 (1975). See generally 1. SKOLNICK, supra note 147, at 120-
37. 
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process through pre-trial diversion. 149 
These discretionary decisions must be made in terms of an 
overall assessment of the broader public interest rather than in 
terms of the merits of each individual case. Making these assess-
ments also requires some centralization of decision making in 
drug law enforcement. Thus, the American prosecutor has be-
come the key arbiter between the accused drug offender and the 
state. 
The prosecutor's role as arbiter of the public interest is at 
odds with other idealized aspects of the criminal process, both ac-
cusatorial and adversarial. The trial judge rather than the prose-
cutor is theoretically the impartial arbiter between the state and 
the accused. 150 In fact, the trial judge simply ratifies prosecutorial 
decisions as to which drug offender should be subject to particular 
investigative, adjudicative, and dispositional measures. In addi-
tion, investigative decisions crucial to the accused's fate are made 
in ex parte proceedings. By the time the process has reached an 
adversarial trial where the accused is represented by counsel, his 
fate has usually been determined, absent some "procedural mis-
take." 
Appellate courts have reacted ambivalently to the tension 
that exists between the ideology of the accusatory system and 
practices that are more akin to an inquisitorial system. Although 
the growing complexity of our society has created the need for 
regulatory drug laws, as noted above, such laws are in fact also 
pressures for new kinds of criminal procedures. 151 Rather than 
openly acknowledge the existence of such inquisitorial themes in 
American criminal law, appellate courts generally have allowed 
the basic tension to remain unresolved. 
Appellate courts might help to eliminate this dissonance by 
reviewing the social control decisions made in drug prosecutions. 
People v. Reed, 152 for instance, illustrates that pre-trial diversion 
decisions are dispositional determinations that should not be 
made solely by prosecutors. In Reed, the court held that the pur-
pose of a special statute for diversion of first time drug offenders 
was to provide rehabilitative treatment for accused drug offend-
149. People v. Reed, 112 Cal. Rptr. 493 (2d Dist. 1974), vacated, 46 Cal. App. 3d 
625, 120 Cal. Rptr. 250 (2d Dist. 1975); State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85, 121, 363 A.2d 
321, 340 (1976), affd on rehearing, 73 N.J. 360, 375 A.2d 607 (1977). 
150. See Goldstein, supra note 141, at 1016-17. 
151. See notes 59-62 & accompanying text supra. 
152. 112 Cal. Rptr. 493 (2d Dist. 1974), vacated, 46 Cal. App. 3d 625, 120 Cal. 
Rptr. 250 (2d Dist. 1975). Upon rehearing, the California Court of Appeal reversed 
the trial court's grant of diversion because it came after the defendant's trial had 
commenced. 46 Cal. App. 3d at 629, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 252 (citing Morse v. Municipal 
Court, 13 Cal. 3d 149, 529 P.2d 46, 118 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1974). 
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ers. 153 The prosecutor argued that his consent was required before 
the defendant could be diverted after trial. The court rejected that 
argument because it reasoned that complete prosecutorial control 
over the pre-trial diversion decisions would be violative of the 
separation of powers doctrine. 
In State v. Leonardis, 154 the New Jersey Supreme Court held 
that a defendant could not be excluded from a pre-trial diversion 
program on the ground that a drug offense is a "heinous crime." 
The court reasoned that the defendant was entitled to a judicial 
hearing focusing on his individual suitability for the program 
before his application for participation in pretrial diversion could 
be rejected. Moreover, the court held that the prosecutor must 
state his reason for denying participation by any defendant in or-
der to "alleviate existing suspicions about the arbitrariness" of 
prosecutors' decisions. Iss 
What the Leonardis court did not acknowledge was its own 
role in reviewing prosecutorial disposition decisions in drug of-
fense cases. One defendant in Leonardis was a college student 
who had been arrested for possession of marijuana; another was 
charged with possession of marijuana and conspiracy to possess 
and distribute marijuana. 156 On their face, the offenses hardly 
seem to be heinous crimes, even if one concedes that some "hard 
drug" offenses are heinous crimes. What probably underlay the 
denial of admission to the pre-trial diversion program was a pros-
ecutor's unarticulated suspicions that both defendants were "key 
distributors" or "pushers" of the illegal drugs. 157 
The procedural analysis of the Leonardis court suggests an 
attempt to impose judicial review of prosecutors' decisions to se-
lect some drug offenders for harsh disposition--criminal incarcer-
ation-and others for less restrictive disposition-release in the 
community to work under supervision through the pre-trial diver-
sion program. Explicit acknowledgement by the judiciary that 
their review of prosecutorial pre-trial diversion decisions involves 
supervision of the prosecutor's dispositional decisions would en-
courage the judiciary to define its own dispositional role in drug 
offenses. 
Such a definition would make visible the choices that must be 
made in resolving society's ambivalence about criminal drug of-
fenses. Actual criminal dispositions in drug cases should ulti-
mately depend upon the values furthered. For instance, analyzing 
153. 112 Cal. Rptr. at 497. 
154. 71 N.J. 85, 363 A.2d 321 (1976). 
155. /d. at 115, 363 A.2d at 332. 
156. /d. at 90, 363 A.2d at 323. 
157. /d. at 113-19, 363 A.2d at 336-39. 
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the proposed drug-related robbery statute 158 in its broadest con-
text should lead to an examination of whether a causal connection 
between drug use and robbery exists in fact. By posing the ques-
tion, decision makers may begin to address the interests to be 
served by imposing criminal liability before deciding dispositional 
policy. The prohibition of robbery protects the values of private 
property and bodily integrity. A dispositional policy for robbery 
should be based upon an analysis of the particular role the crimi-
nal law plays in upholding the interests of private property and 
bodily integrity. Such an assessment could well lead to a disposi-
tional rule requiring some period of incarceration for a convicted 
robber. A more refined analysis would be required to determine 
how long the period of incarceration should be. 
In contrast, the values upheld by the typical drug offense, 
those of health and individual liberty, are more difficult to ex-
plain.159 "A particular notion of individual physical and mental 
health-that the free man is unshackled by the vices of . . . 
drugs-is promoted" 160 by prohibiting individual drug use.' 61 Il-
licit drug users and distributors, of course, would define liberty 
and health differently. For them, liberty is freedom from govern-
ment interference, and in their view there should be no criminal 
sanction for drug use. 162 For the drug user in particular, health or 
well-being might be defined as a "continual high." Judicial dispo-
sitional policies for drug offenses must develop a method of ac-
commodating these alternative definitions of liberty and health. 
Addressing these divergent definitions of the basic values may al-
low courts to see that the use of the criminal sanction allows the 
majority, through the regulatory process for drugs, to impose its 
view of liberty and health upon the minority. Under these cir-
cumstances, a dispositional rule requiring probation or non-incar-
ceration should be the preferred criminal disposition for all drug 
offenses. 
-- .. - -· 
The divergent dispositional rules of probation for drug of-
fenders and incarceration for robbers reflect the degree of confi-
dence one should have in the criminal law as a means of social 
158. See notes 136-38 & accompanying text supra. 
159. Palmer, A Model of Criminal Dispositions, supra note I, at 9-10. 
160. /d. at 17. 
161. Under this view, the drug trafficker is preying on an individual in need of the 
law's parens patriae. The assumption is that the community's health is protected by 
state control of individual decision making. As this class of crimes is in fact struc-
tured, however, it upholds the value of the state process. Under this alternative view, 
the state system of decision making with regard to drug use and distribution is pro-
tected by state direction of individual decision making. See generally J. WILSON, note 
31 supra. 
162. See Packer, The Aims o/ the Criminal Law Revisited· A Plea for a New Look 
at "Substantive Due Process," 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 490 (1971). 
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control. Despite some doubts, 163 it must be acknowledged that the 
criminal law plays a unique and viable role in protecting the val-
ues of property and bodily security. Tort liability in the form of 
conversion, or assault actions, or even new systems of social com-
pensation for injury will not achieve the same fundamental social 
ordering as the criminal sanction. On the other hand, the value of 
health is not generally promoted through criminal law. Society is 
becoming increasingly reluctant to use the criminal process to pro-
mote health even though that coercive process is sometimes neces-
sary.164 In other words, the social institutions designed to promote 
health-the family, the doctor-patient relationship, the hospi-
tal-have generally operated with little interference from the legal 
system. 165 
An interest analysis of the values that underlie the currently 
employed framework of drug controls could lead appellate courts 
to question legislative and administrative judgments about the 
harm from drugs. 166 With a fuller understanding of both the posi-
tive and negative aspects of drug use, appellate courts could re-
view the dispositional decisions of prosecutors in drug control 
cases. Appropriate appellate dispositional rule making may lead 
policy makers to become relatively indifferent at the sentencing 
stage to whether a robber is or is not a drug user. 
Ill. ELIMINATING PAROLE: WHO SHOULD HAVE AUTHORITY 
TO DETERMINE THE SOCIAL NEED FOR INDIVIDUAL 
PREVENTION? 
Consistent with the previously developed· framework for dis-
positional rule making, a comprehensive redefinition of the appel-
late court role requires an analysis of the proper relationship 
between the courts and the correctional processes. In what fol-
lows, a detailed analysis of two general categories of sentencing 
reform attempts to serve that end. 
163. See Del Vecchio, Equality and Inequality in Relation to Justice, II NAT'L L.F. 
36, 42-45 ( 1966 ). 
164. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). 
165. Compare Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and 
Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 340, 349-50 ( 1974) (suggesting the function of in-
formed consent is "personalized" technical deeisions for the patients) with Goldstein, 
For Harold Laswell· Some R4fections on Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Con-
sent, and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683, 690-98 ( 1975) (suggesting the function of 
informed consent is to provide standards for doctors to use in the process of informing 
patients of the consequences of their waiver of rights). 
166. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Miller, [1976) 20 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2331 
(Roxbury, Mass. Dist. Mun. Ct. 1976). 
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A. Allocating the Authority to Determine the Purposes of 
Imposing Sanctions on Individuals 
789 
The Maine legislature eliminated parole in its recent compre-
hensive revision of its laws on sentencing and corrections. 167 With 
the elimination of the institution of parole, the prison term deter-
mined by the sentencing judge should be the term of incarceration 
in fact served by the offender. 168 The legislature articulated the 
purposes of its dispositional reform, 169 so we may expect definite 
sentences that are congruent with the society's aims. 
Officials operating under the Maine statute (with stated pur-
poses as divergent as crime deterrence and the elimination of in-
equities), 170 however, receive no greater guidance from this statute 
than from previous schemes. Following prevailing practice, the 
Maine legislature delegated to the sentencing judge the authority 
to determine initially the need for "individual prevention" in pre-
scribing sentences. And while the statute eliminates parole, it re-
tains the optional sanctions of fine, unconditional discharge, and 
probation or revocation oflicense.l 71 Hence, upon close examina-
tion, the Maine statute resembles most other statutory schemes, 
since correctional officials still share decision making authority 
with the sentencing judge in an undefined manner. 
Under the Maine legislation, any sentence of more than one 
year is deemed tentative; that is, the sentence must be evaluated 
and reviewed by correctional officials. After the review, the De-
partment of Corrections and Mental Hygiene can petition the 
court for discretionary resentencing under either of two statutorily 
defined circumstances. If, after some initial observation of the of-
fender, the correctional officials decide that the trial court may 
have based its sentence on "a misapprehension as to the history, 
character, physical or mental condition of the offender," 172 the 
Department may file a petition for an adjustment of the sentence. 
Alternatively, the Department may file a petition if it doubts the 
sentencing judge's ability to estimate "the amount of time that 
would be necessary to provide for protection of the public from 
such offender." 173 
By authorizing the evaluation of both individual factors and 
167. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 1251-1254 (West Supp. 1978). 
168. Some commentators have vigorously advocated the elimination of parole as a 
means of obtaining more certain sentences. D. FoGEL, " ... WE ARE THE LIVING 
PROOF ... " ( 1975). 
169. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 1151-1157, 1201-1206, 1251-1254 & offi-
cial comments (West Supp. 1978). 
170. !d. tit. 17-A, § 1151. 
171. /d. tit. 17-A, § 1152(2)-(4). 
172. /d. tit. 17-A, § 1154(2). 
173. /d. 
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social control needs, the statute in effect allows the Department to 
recommend parole for the offenders. Then, when the sentencing 
court receives such a petition, it has before it the Department's 
"expert" evaluation of the offender's progress toward a "noncrimi-
nal way of life." 174 Moreover, the court is restricted by a legisla-
tive prohibition against increasing the sentence originally 
imposed. 175 This process is the functional equivalent of tradi-
tional parole decision making; the difference is merely that the 
administrative agency makes recommendations instead of actually 
making the parole decision. The judge is the purported final deci-
sion maker. There is, however, little reason to believe that the 
results of discretionary resentencing will be different from the re-
sults of the prevailing parole practices. 176 
These legislative attempts to control the discretion of sentenc-
ing courts and correctional officials have little chance of success 
because they fail to embody a theory of the allocation of disposi-
tional authority. Such a theory should be built on the experience 
gained by appellate courts in the administration of the criminal 
law. At present, however, this experience is unavailable to the leg-
islature because appellate courts have not assumed a policy-mak-
ing role in dispositional decision making. Though Maine has a 
legislative provision for appellate review of sentencing, the appel-
late court function in sentencing has never been made explicit. 177 
Furthermore, a specialized appellate tribunal hears sentencing ap-
peals. Thus, Maine's highest appellate court, which regularly en-
gages in criminal law policy making, 178 never hears a sentencing 
appeal. 
Maine is not unique in this respect. Other states authorizing 
review of sentences have generally limited the appellate courts' 
role to the elimination of the occasional "grossly excessive" sen-
tence rather than participation in dispositional policy making. 179 
Again it must be emphasized that the appellate courts should be 
the institution responsible for allocating decision-making author-
ity between trial courts and correctional officials within the dispo-
sitional process. 180 To do so, the courts must first articulate the 
purposes of imposing sentences in particular crimes and then allo-
174. /d. 
175. /d. tit. 17-A, § 1154(4). 
176. See Palmer, A Model if Criminal Dispositions, supra note I, at 35-46. 
177. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2141-2144 (West 1977 & Supp. 1978). 
178. See. e.g., State v. Wilbur, 278 A.2d 139 (Me. 1971), vacated sub nom. Wilbur 
v. Robbins, 349 F. Supp. (D. Me. 1972), qfjd sub nom. Wilbur v. Mullaney, 473 F.2d 
943 (1st Cir. 1973), remanded, 414 U.S. 1139, affdon rehearing, 496 F.2d 1303 (1st 
Cir.), qfjd, 421 U.S. 684 (1974). 
179. See Halperin, Sentence Review in Maine: Comparisons and Comments, 18 ME. 
L. REV. 133 (1966). 
180. See Palmer, A Model if Criminal Dispositions, supra note I, at 35-46. 
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cate decision-making authority among the various officials to 
achieve those purposes. 
1. Judicial Determination of the Need for Retribution and 
General Deterrence 
Assuming the existence of proper legal standards for deter-
mining whether state control is justified, it is proposed that trial 
courts, with appellate court approval, ought to determine the max-
imum length of sentences based on the social control purposes of 
general deterrence and retribution. 1 R 1 For instance, rather than 
try to determine whether a particular robber needs to serve the 
long term authorized for robbery, 1R2 the trial and appellate courts 
should determine the sentence for robbery, generally. In this ef-
fort, the appellate courts would focus on two factors: first, what 
prison term best serves the need for general deterrence of robbery; 
and second, what term serves the community's need for retribu-
tion resulting from the interference with the social values of prop-
erty and bodily security. 
Such appellate rule making is necessary because the long 
maximum sentences usually authorized for the crime of robbery 
serve a variety of purposes other than the provision of guidelines 
as to the imposition of individual sanctions. 183 General deter-
rence and the need for retribution, defined in terms of specific so-
cial values and not by the individual characteristics of the 
offender, should be used to establish the upper limits of the length 
of sentences. 
2. Administrative Determination of the Need for Individual 
Prevention 
The proposal here is that the administrative agency, for ex-
ample, the parole board or its equivalent, is the institution that 
should consider individual factors in determining whether a par-
ticular person should be released before the expiration of his term. 
Within that maximum sentence established through appellate dis-
positional rule making, the parole board should determine what 
reasonable risks should be taken in allowing a particular individ-
ual to serve less than the maximum sentence. 
181. !d. at 10-21. 
182. A typical robbery statute authorizes maximum sentence of 15 years for sim-
ple robbery and 25 years for armed robbery. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. 
§§ 2911.01-.02, 2929.11 (B)( I )-(2) (Baldwin 1978). 
183. The maximum sentence authorized by the legislature is important in deter-
mining its "proportionality." See Coker v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 815 (1977). However, 
the infliction of a particular sanction on an individual in some circumstances requires 
a process of decision making that is "individualized." See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153 (1976) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion). 
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For the parole board to make this determination, it would 
have to address two general kinds of questions with respect to the 
individual transgressor. First, is the release of this individual at 
this time likely to lead to his reintegration into the community? 
Within this broad question the board would examine, for instance, 
what resources are available in the community and whether they 
are available to this particular individual. 1s4 Second, does the 
community's interest in the value of liberty outweigh the risk that 
this individual will again jeopardize a value legitimately protected 
by the criminal law? While both questions are somewhat open 
ended, they at least necessitate a more focused inquiry than do 
existing decision-making practices, which allow both trial judges 
and correction officials to weigh the more general purposes of dis-
positions. The more focused inquiry would also allow appellate 
courts to supervise the use of individual factors in decisions about 
release. 185 
3. Appellate Court Supervision of the Individual Prevention 
Function 
Appellate courts having occasion to review parole board deci-
sion making have generally imposed procedural requirements. 
For instance, one appellate court has required parole boards to 
give a statement of reasons when parole is denied. 1s6 This prac-
tice has led litigants to assume that further "procedural reform" 
rather than substantive policy analysis should be pursued before 
the appellate courts. 
Thus, in a group of consolidated cases 187 where the parole 
board gave its reasons for denying parole, appellate counsel for 
the prisoners attacked the procedures used by the board. 18s The 
appellate court denied the claims and praised the parole board's 
attempts to administer the process fairly under existing guidelines. 
The court selected one case, that of Walter Beckworth, 189 to illus-
trate the operation of the guidelines and procedures developed by 
the parole board. 
184. This question is aimed at evaluating the community's tolerance for the partic-
ular individual who engaged in the prohibited activity. See Lasswell & Donnelly, The 
Continuing Debate over Responsibility: An Introduction to Isolating the Condemnation 
Sanction, 68 YALE L.J. 869 (1959). 
185. See Palmer, A Model o.f Criminal Dirpositions, supra note I. at 11-21. 
186. Monks v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 58 N.J. 238, 277 A.2d 193 (1971). 
187. Beckworth v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 348,301 A.2d 727 (1973). 
188. Besides attacking the adequacy of the reasons given by the parole board, see 
rd. at 359, 30 I A.2d at 733, counsel for appellants made several claims including: (I) 
Jack of prior notification of materials in parole board's file, id. at 362, 30 I A.2d at 734-
35; (2) informality of the parole release interview and hearing, rd. at 363, 30 I A.2d at 
735; and (3) Jack of counsel at parole release hearing, id. at 366, 301 A.2d at 736-37. 
189. /d. at 351, 301 A.2d at 729. 
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The case is one in which counsel for Beckworth could have 
invoked the appellate court's policy-making role in an attempt to 
win Beckworth's release. At the age of thirty-eight, Beckworth 
killed a friend's wife. Beckworth, then estranged from his com-
mon law wife, 190 had moved into the home of a male friend, had 
an affair with the friend's wife, and strangled her after an argu-
ment. Following a plea of no contest, 191 he was sentenced to a 
term of fifteen to twenty years. He was first eligible for parole 
four years after his incarceration but was denied parole when he 
appeared before the board. Two years later, he was again denied 
parole. Two weeks after the second denial, he escaped from 
prison. After six months, Beckworth was recaptured and sen-
tenced to an additional year for escaping. 192 
A year after his escape, Beckworth was granted another hear-
ing but was again denied parole. This time, however, Beckworth 
appealed the denial and, on appeal, asked for and received a re-
mand of his case to be heard by the board. Nine months later his 
case was reheard, and the board again denied his parole. 193 
Beckworth by this time had served eight years of his original 
fifteen to twenty year sentence. In all three of the parole denials, 
the board had noted his difficulties in relating to women. The 
board's view was supported each time by a consulting psycholo-
gist who noted Beckworth's hostility toward women, "poor judg-
ment," and his lack of insight into the "circumstances which 
brought him to prison."l94 
Although counsel for Beckworth thought it at least intuitively 
unfair to condition Beckworth's liberty now on his character at the 
time of the homicide, 195 counsel failed to turn that contention into 
an appellate argument of fairness which might have demonstrated 
that the parole board had exceeded its proper function. The 
board gave as the reasons for its denial the fact that the "punitive 
and deterrent aspects" of Beckworth's sentences had not been ful-
filled.196 Thus the board assumed a dispositional function more 
properly that of a sentencing judge. The mixing of the general 
social control purposes of deterrence and retribution with assess-
ments of Beckworth's unchanged condition skewed the decision in 
favor of social control, generally. A decision-making model ofpa-
190. /d. 
191. The plea is significant in that it requires the court to gamer information from 
"other sources" rather than through "adjudication." 
192. Beckworth v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 348, 352, 301 A.2d 727, 
729 (1973). 
193. /d. at 350, 352, 30 I A.2d at 728, 729. 
194. /d. at 352, 30 I A.2d at 729. 
195. /d. at 359, 301 A.2d at 733. 
196. /d. at 353, 301 A.2d at 729-30. 
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role that maximized the value of liberty would have directed the 
decision makers' inquiries toward the particular known risks in 
the case before it. Using the facts as established, counsel for 
Beckworth could have made a principled argument for 
Beckworth's release. 
A two-fold inquiry should have focused on the improper de-
cision making by the parole board and the improper methods of 
weighing individual risks. First, counsel should have maintained 
that the parole board improperly emphasized the punitive and de-
terrent aspects of the sentence. The judge who is closest to the 
criminal liability decision is in the best possible position to assess 
the social need for retribution and general deterrence. This was 
especially true in Beckworth's case, since there was no formal ad-
judication of his guilt. 197 Thus, counsel should have argued that 
the parole board had construed its legislative mandate too 
broadly. 
Second, because the board failed to limit its inquiry to indi-
vidual characteristics, neither the parole board nor the reviewing 
court had access to the information which might have revealed the 
unfairness inherent in the board's decision. The factors actually 
evaluated included Beckworth's act of killing a woman, his "at-
tempted" suicide, his three unstable marriages, his continuing pro-
jection of blame on the women for the marital failures, and factors 
contained in reports from professional treatment staff. 198 Atten-· 
tion should have been directed at a host of unasked (and, perhaps, 
unanswerable) questions. 
Even if one assumes the accuracy of the parole board's ap-
praisal of those factors actually considered, the proper question for 
the board was whether remaining in prison would aggravate 
Beckworth's condition or hold forth any hope of improvement. 
The more proper line of inquiry would have led a reviewing court 
into a realistic assessment of this individual vis-a-vis the resources 
available. For example, assuming Beckworth needs treatment, is 
such treatment available in the community or even in prison? 
Given the limited resources of a typical prison, it is unlikely that 
proper treatment would be available there. Even were the parole 
board to release the prisoner conditionally to obtain treatment, 
such treatment would have to be available. One might inquire, in 
this regard, whether the parole board and its parole counselors 199 
investigated whether there were mental health facilities in the 
community that might offer Beckworth treatment. Such a line of 
inquiry is the means by which appellate defense counsel can assess 
197. See note 191 supra. 
198. 62 N.J. at 353, 301 A.2d at 730. 
199. /d. at 355, 301 A.2d at 731. 
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the functioning of the parole board and explore the reasoning 
processes of the criminal administrative agency for an appellate 
court. 
This second line of inquiry seeks to direct the reviewing 
court's attention to the tendency of parole boards to favor the val-
ues of social control over those of liberty. Such direction is espe-
cially needed in cases where deterrent and retributive aspects have 
been vindicated in the original sentence for murder. Counsel 
should ask whether the board has examined and rejected as unac-
ceptable the conditions under which it might release the individ-
ual. In Beckworth's case, this would involve a difficult inquiry 
into factors such as Beckworth's social and sexual relations with 
women. If, for instance, Beckworth were not willing to seek treat-
ment, but would report on his social life to his parole officer, 
would he then be an acceptable risk in the community? 
Before the suggested condition is rejected as "some unconsti-
tutional invasion of privacy and liberty,"200 note that the particu-
lar decision is actuallly one of weighing conditional liberty against 
nonliberty. In other words, would society prefer to let Beckworth 
have limited conditional contacts in the community rather than 
remain in prison for a longer period of time? A parole board 
might answer this question by suggesting that prison is preferable 
because "freedom" with state intrusion into one's sexual life does 
not conform to the board's notion of liberty. 
However, an appellate judge accepting this determination 
would have to acknowledge openly that Beckworth is simply be-
ing held in a form of preventive detention for social control pur-
poses. The policy choice would be even more apparent were the 
resources for treatment available in the community but not in 
prison. In that case, the court's approval of the board decision 
would make visible to society the harsh consequences of its policy 
choices in individual cases. It would also make the public and 
other decision makers aware that proper treatment may never be 
available in prison. 
At a time when even prison administrators are admitting 
their inability to rehabilitate,201 the choice to keep Beckworth con-
fined should appear unfair to the court. While the risk of 
Beckworth's becoming involved in another homicide should be 
acknowledged, it should not be determinative.202 The value of 
human life, like the value of liberty, must be risked in disposi-
tional decision making. Beckworth appears to be a case in which 
200. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1975). 
201. D. FoGEL, note 168 supra. · 
202. See Dershowitz, Indeterminate Confinement: Lelling the Therapy Fit the 
Harm, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 297, 320 n.85 (1974). 
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an appellate court with the power to review sentences203 should 
have held that the parole board had given the value of individual 
liberty insufficient weight. 
B. Reforming Disposition Without Reference to Adjudication 
In .general, the Maine reform seeks to establish new legal 
standards for sentencing and correctional decisions with little ref-
erence to the evolving standards of criminal accountability. For 
example, the Maine statute assumes we can have "sentences which 
do not diminish the gravity of offenses"204 without explicitly con-
sidering the nature of particular offenses.205 On a metaphysical 
. level, the legislature sought to encourage 'just individualization" 
of sentences without a standard of what is "just"206 or what are 
"legitimate criminological goals."207 In effect, the Maine legisla-
ture attempted to deal with the dispositional or punishment issues 
as distinct items for reform. 
In so doing, the legislature failed to take account of the inter-
relationship of punishment and responsibility. The average citi-
zens thinks about crime in terms of its moral consequences.208 
The label "murder," for instance, carries with it the connotation 
that the offender should be punished.209 Law, on the other hand, 
has not only moral consequences but coercive ones as well. As 
demonstrated above,210 the law separates the question of criminal 
liability-adjudication-from the question of punish-
ment-disposition. After a delineation of the distinctive features 
of adjudication and disposition in legal decision making, an inte-
gration of the two functions adds to an overall understanding of 
the criminal process. The Maine legislature failed to perceive that 
203. See State v. Ward, 57 N.J. 75, 270 A.2d 1 (1970). 
204. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1151(8) (West Supp. 1978). 
205. See notes 35-50 & accompanying text supra. 
206. Legal philosophy would :appear to be of great relevance to a further study of 
sentencing. But until the broad school of legal philosophies allows the unique feature 
of a legal system, legal decision making, to enter its debates, the influence of legal 
philosophy on sentencing will be slight. Professor Graham Hughes, without specific 
references to the problems of sentencing, has noted the failure of legal philosophers to 
examine the nature of legal reasoning and decision making. See Hughes, Rules, Pol-
icy and Decision-Making, 77 YALE L.J. 411, 439 n.22 (1968). Although certainly wor-
thy of further study, a meaningful integration of legal philosophy and judicial 
dispositional rules is beyond the scope of this Article. 
207. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1151(5) (West Supp. 1978). 
208. As concepts, punishment and responsibility are metaphysicial notions whose 
interrelationship deserves to be treated at length in books, not footnotes. See gener-
ally H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968). Significantly, 
problems in this area are replete with concepts that are changing over time. See Lass-
well & Donnelly, supra note 184, at 875. 
209. See generally J. FEINBERG, DOING & DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY 
OF RESPONSIBILITY 38-54 ( 1970). 
210. See text accompanying notes 14-17 supra. 
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reform of present dispositional practices requires reference to 
present and fluctuating standards of adjudication. 
In summary, an analysis of the Maine reform effort reveals 
three defects in the legislature's decision to eliminate parole. 
First, appellate courts rather than legislatures are the forum in 
which the policy-oriented integration of adjudication and disposi-
tion necessary for reform should take place. The administration 
of the criminal law necessitates an integration of its various func-
tional stages. Second, the concept of criminal accountability is 
open to question and reevaluation in the course of appellate court 
deCision making. Thus, "the uncertainty, confusion and inconsis-
tency"211 that exist in society's notions of criminal accountability 
are most visible in modern appellate court decision making. Fi-
nally, the drafters of the Maine reform package had no theory of 
dispositional decision making delineating the particular functions 
of the courts and criminal administrative agencies in imposing 
sanctions upon individuals. 
IV. MANDATORY SENTENCING IN CALIFORNIA: A VARIATION 
ON THE THEME OF OFFICIAL DISCRETION IN 
SENTENCING 
A. California's Determinative Sentencing Law 
Prior to a recent reform, the California sentencing and cor-
rectional system epitomized the practice of indeterminate sentenc-
ing in America. The trial judge's sentencing decision was 
essentially a choice between granting the offender some form of 
supervised release or placing him in prison under the custody of 
the Adult Authority for an indefinite term. For example, a person 
convicted of robbery who was not placed on probation was sen-
tenced to a term of incarceration that would last a minimum of 
five years and could potentially last for life.212 The Adult Author-
ity periodically redetermined the term of confinement on the basis 
of diagnostic tests, the convict's conduct in prison and his progress 
towards reform.213 In addition, the Adult Authority supervised 
individuals whom it had released.214 Granting the Adult Author-
ity, a criminal administrative agency, a vast amount of discretion 
over the disposition of an offender was consistent with the ethos of 
211. See Lasswell & Donnelly, supra note 184, at 875. 
212. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 213 (West 1970) (current version at CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 213 (West Supp. 1979)). 
213. See 1. GOLDSTEIN, A. DERSHOWITZ & R. SCHWARTZ, supra note 24, at 613-
30, 641-56 (describing the previous California system). 
214. See, e.g., In re Sturm, II Cal. 3d 258, 521 P.2d 97, 113 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1974); 
In re Minnis, 7 Cal. 3d 639, 498 P.2d 997, 102 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1972). 
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individualization that has dominated sentencing practices in 
America. 
Under a new mandatory sentencing scheme, however, the 
trial judge is authorized to impose one of three terms of imprison-
ment when probation is not granted. Today, a person convicted of 
robbery will either be placed on probation or incarcerated for two, 
three, or four years.215 If incarceration is chosen, the trial judge 
must impose the middle sentence unless he finds, after a motion 
and hearing, that aggravating or mitigating factors exist.216 Al-
though there is no statutory enumeration of the factors for aggra-
vating or mitigating prison terms or for determining when 
probation should be given, the trial judge must sentence in ac-
cordance with the rules of the Judicial Council.2 17 Release prior 
to expiration of judicially imposed terms of imprisonment is based 
on the review and recommendation of a new Community Release 
Board to the sentencing court. This new Board also operates 
under the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council.218 
Thus, the effectiveness of the California reforms depends 
upon the effectiveness of the rules promulgated by the Judicial 
Council. An examination of any of the rules reveals the basic ap-
proach: to allow the trial judge to consider as many factors as pos-
sible. For instance, the "criteria affecting probation" include the 
likelihood of dangers to others, facts surrounding the crime, and 
facts relating to the defendant. 219 Since the criteria are not exclu-
sive, 220 the sentencing judge is free to give greater or lesser empha-
sis to particular factors he may choose. Apparently he may cite 
anyfactor as a reason for granting or denying probation. 
The rules do not, for instance, tell the trial judge whether 
danger of addiction221 is a reason for incarceration. Such a deter-
mination would require an analysis of the function that criminal 
drug prohibitions play in preventing crime or protecting soci-
ety.222 Apparently, the Judicial Council deems the individual trial 
judge's analysis of the problem as sufficient since the judge need 
only recite the reason for his decision. 223 
Given the composition of the Judicial Council, the failure to 
resolve the underlying policy issues in sentencing is not surprising. 
The California Judicial Council is an appointed body consisting 
215. CAL. PENAL CoDE§§ 213, 1170(a)(2) (West Supp. 1979). 
216. /d.§ 1170(b). 
217. !d.§ 1170(a)(2). 
218. /d.§ 1170(d). 
219. CAL. R. CT. 414. 
220. CAL. R. CT. 408. 
221. CAL. R. CT. 414(d)(1), (6). 
222. See CAL. R. CT. 410(a), (d), (e). 
223. CAL. PENAL CoDE§ 1170(c) (West Supp. 1979); CAL. R. CT. 443. 
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of judges of the various courts, members of the bar, and members 
of the legislature.224 The state's constitution empowers the Coun-
cil to establish the rules of practice of the courts and to perform 
other duties defined by statute.225 The newly promulgated sen-
tencing rules define its general objectives in terms surprisingly 
similar to those of the legislature. The Judicial Council states that 
two objectives of its rules are "(a) protecting society, [and] (b) 
punishing the defendant .... "226 ln similar fashion, the legisla-
ture enacting the new mandatory sentencing schemes declared 
"that the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment."227 
Such vague statements of purpose are unlikely to encourage the 
Judicial Council to establish rules that provide meaningful gui-
dance for the resolution of actual cases.228 
While the rules and statute require judges to state their rea-
sons for the sentence,229 there is no indication that the offender 
can appeal on the grounds that the trial judge's reasons reflect un-
sound dispositional policy. Rather, the Judicial Council will use 
these reasons as empirical evidence in either revising its rules or 
making recommendations to the legislature for modifying the stat-
utes.230 Apparently, the convicted offender is supposed to treat 
these often conflicting rules as valid and focus his appellate argu-
ment on the propriety of the trial judge's application of the rules. 
But because appellate courts have assumed a larger policy-making 
role in criminal law decision making generally, offenders of their 
counsel should be encouraged to take a more aggressive attitude 
towards the new rules. The California sentencing rules and the 
legislation fail to mention the appellate judiciary which must 
eventually resolve these policy conflicts. 
B. People v. Tanner: An Indication o.f the Judicial Response to 
Mandatory Sentencing 
The recent case of People v. Tanner231 illustrates the point. In 
224. CAL CoNsT. art. 6, § 6. 
225. /d. 
226. CAL. R. CT. 410. 
227. CAL. PENAL CoDE§ 1170 (West Supp. 1979). 
228. Administrative rule making by courts through judicial councils has not usu-
ally resolved underlying policy conflicts. Professor Coffee has suggested in a slightly 
different context that attempts to use such bodies to develop rules for sentencing leads 
to the "problem of accountability" since judicial councils are not accountable to the 
political process or organized professional groups. See Coffee, Repressed Issues of 
Sentencing: Accountability, Predictability and Equality in the Era of the Sentencing 
Commission, 66 GEO. L.J. 975, 1008 n.87 (1978). 
229. CAL. PENAL CoDE§ 1170(c) (West Supp. 1979). 
230. ld. §§ 1170.4-.6. 
231. 23 Cal. 3d 16, 587 P.2d 1112, 151 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1978), vacated rehearing 
granted (Feb. 8, 1979). 
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Tanner, the California Supreme Court was asked to resolve the 
conflict between two statutory provisions in the context of review-
ing the sentence the trial judge had given a convicted robber. As 
part of the current movement towards mandatory sentencing, the 
California legislature recently prohibited trial judges from grant-
ing probation for anyone convicted of using a firearm to commit a 
robbery. 232 Another section of the statute required that the use of 
a firearm must be alleged in the indictment and found by the 
factfinder. 233 Tanner met both criteria since he admitted the rob-
bery at trial, and the jury found that he had committed the crime 
with a firearm. 234 
The trial judge charged with the responsibility of sentencing 
Tanner, however, relied upon a previously enacted statute and 
line of cases and struck the finding of firearm use. 235 Following 
the dismissal of the special finding, the judge imposed a five-year 
prison term, which he suspended on the conditions that Tanner 
spend one year in county jail and that he undergo psychiatric 
treatment. 236 He justified the sentence on the basis of the unusual 
facts surrounding the robbery as developed in trial testimony and 
the probation report. 237 Had the trial judge not dismissed the 
finding of gun use, he would have been required, under the stat·· 
ute, to send Tanner to state prison. The state appealed. 
In its initial Tanner opinion (rehearing was later granted and 
the decision, therefore, was vacated), a plurality of the court re-
jected the state's argument that the later enacted mandatory gun 
use statute forbidding probation for firearm felonies superseded 
the older statute allowing dismissals by trial judges at sentencing. 
The rejection of this argument required the plurality to discuss 
explicitly the legislative intent in conjunction with the court's own 
previous interpretations of similar statutory provisions for sen·· 
tencing.238 Despite the political rhetoric indicating the legislative 
intent that all robbers using a gun must go to state prison, the 
plurality held that the legislature did not intend to overrule an 
232. CAL. PENAL CoDE§ 1203.06(a)(l)(iii) (West Supp. 1979). 
233. /d.§ 1203.06(b)(l). 
234. 23 Cal. 3d at 22,587 P.2d at 1114-15, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 301-02. 
235. /d. at 23,587 P.2d at 1115, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 302. 
236. /d. 
237. Tanner, a security guard, in admitting the robbery at trial, claimed he was 
only trying to convince the store owner to resubscribe to the security service for which 
Tanner worked. The victim of the robbery, a clerk, testified that Tanner had engaged 
in a friendly conversation and instructed the clerk to call the police and identify him, 
Tanner, as the robber. The probation report indicated that Tanner had never been 
arrested or convicted before and that Tanner's employers had all given him good 
recommendations. The investigating police detective did not believe Tanner should 
be sentenced to state prison for the offense. The report recommended a six-month jail 
term and a period of probation. /d. 
238. /d. at 24-35, 587 P.2d at 1116-24, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 303-11. 
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entire body of judicial doctrine preserving the judiciary's preroga-
tive to dismiss part of indictments in the "interests of justice."239 
The concurring opinion would have reached the same result 
but on constitutional grounds: the legislature meant to forbid pro-
bation in Tanner's case, but such prohibition violated the princi-
ples of separation of powers. 240 Moreover, the determination of 
"penalty enhancement factors" was a judicial function that the 
legislature had, in effect, delegated to the local prosecutor, an ex-
ecutive officer. The dissenting justices took issue with the concur-
ring opinion's constitutional interpretation and the plurality's 
interpretation of legislative intent. 241 
This abbreviated analysis of Tanner suggests two things 
about the relationship of appellate courts to mandatory sentencing 
reform. First, the plurality of the court, at least, demonstrated a 
willingness to examine new "mandatory" schemes in light of pre-
vious judicial interpretations of legislative dispositional policies. 
Where the court perceived a conflict in those policies, it appeared 
prepared to resolve those conflicts in terms of its perception of 
proper dispositional policy. A trial judge trying to avoid a harsher 
result, as in Tanner, or an ingenious defense counsel will often be 
able to find a conflicting statement of penal policy somewhere in 
the morass of penal and correctional laws in California or in the 
judicial interpretations of those policies. Second, the concurring 
opinion in Tanner illustrates how easily a dispositional issue can 
be transformed into a constitutional issue when sentencing reform 
ignores the role of appellate courts. Given the political climate in 
California supporting mandatory sentencing, the Tanner case 
should certainly receive extended analysis. At the very least, Tan-
ner indicated an unwillingness on the part of some appellate 
judges to resolve all conflicts in the administration of new disposi-
tional schemes through a mechanistic reference to the maxim that 
"it is the legislature's function" to determine punishment. 
By failing to resolve the basic conflicts, the new sentencing 
rules and the legislation invite a resolution on a constitutional ba-
sis. Prior to the adoption of the new legislation, the California 
appellate judiciary had already begun to question the operation of 
the indeterminate sentencing law.242 Although these decisions in-
volved complex constitutional analyses, the courts raised basic 
239. /d. at 35, 587 P.2d at 1124, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 311. 
240. /d. at 39, 587 P.2d at 1126, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 313 (Bird, C.J., concurring and 
dissenting). 
241. /d. at 44-52, 587 P.2d at 1129-35, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 316-22 (Clark & Richard-
son, J J ., dissenting). 
242. See, e.g., In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972) 
(declaring the indeterminate life sentence for a second conviction of indecent expo-
sure as "disproportionate" to the crime). 
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policy questions about the nature of offenses and the terms of in-
carcerations. For example, the California Supreme Court's con-
stitutional analysis of "disproportionality" included a 
consideration of the penological purposes served by particular of-
fenses.243 
In sum, the California legislation demonstrates some basic in-
adequacies of present legislative reform of sentencing. First, like 
the Maine legislature, the California legislature has isolated only 
the "punishment" issues for reform.244 By stating the issues in this 
way, the legislature can employ a stated purpose of punishment to 
disguise the more basic motivations behind social control in our 
society.245 Second, although the California legislature saw a rela-
tionship between correctional decision making and sentencing de-
cisions, there is no uniform dispositional theory. Such a theory 
must include the individual's right to test the legality of his dispo-
sition because it is his liberty that is at stake.246 The determina-
tion of the legality of the criminal process ultimately rests with the 
appellate courts. Thus, the California scheme fails to acknowl-
edge the role of the courts in shaping criminal dispositional deci-
sion making. 247 
To encompass the variety of goals and values upheld through 
the criminal law, a code should include a statement of the general 
purposes of the criminal law before the particular purposes of sen-
tencing.248 Such a statement of purpose should disregard the no-
menclature of punishment249 since the term adds little to an 
understanding of legal decision making. A general purposes sec-
tion of a code combined with an explicit statement that the appel-
l~te courts are empowered to develop rules for sentencing would 
be a legislative authorization for courts to resolve conflicts of pur-
poses in individual cases. Without an explicit discussion of the 
issue of legal decision making in dispositions by appellate courts, 
little more than variations on the theme of official discretion250 
through legislative reform of sentencing can be expected. 
243. In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 923, 519 P.2d 1073, 1082, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649, 657 
(1974). 
244. CAL. PENAL CoDE§ 1170(e) (West Supp. 1979). 
245. See text accompanying notes 181-211 supra. 
246. See text accompanying notes 205-13 supra. 
247. See text accompanying notes 231-41 supra. 
248. See Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 401 
(1958). 
249. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. DERSHOWITZ & R. SCHWARTZ, supra note 24, at 724-
27. 
250. See Palmer, A Model of Criminal Dispositions, supra note I, at 53-59. 
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
That sentencing practices and policies need reform has not 
been questioned in this Article. What has been seriously ques-
tioned, however, is the wisdom of the movement towards legisla-
tively mandated sentencing. These legislative attempts to modify 
the discretionary aspects of sentencing and parole are by and large 
based on simplistic conceptions of the interrelationship of the var-
ious components of the criminal process. This Article's resistance 
to present "reform packages" is an attempt to develop a legal 
framework for determining the limits of the policy-making role of 
particular officials in the disposition of individuals. 
Appellate courts should perform an important role in both 
guiding dispositional policy making and legitimating the roles of 
various dispositional decision makers. This Article has demon-
strated, for example, that mandatory sentences for "illegal" gun 
possession raise fundamental questions for legislatures and courts 
about the role of police in the disposition of individuals. Appel-
late courts should recognize the implicit legislative delegation to 
police of a crime prevention function in the definition of the ille-
gal gun possession offense. Further, appellate courts must ac-
knowledge their own power to limit the crime prevention role of 
police through a variety of doctrines. 
In other areas, this Article has demonstrated that appellate 
courts must develop systematic theories of social control. Sen-
tencing policy for drug offenses must be developed in the context 
of answering the following question: What is the particular and 
appropriate role of the criminal process in the social control of 
drug abuse? Lurking beneath this issue is the larger question of 
the degree to which an "inquisitional" model of the criminal proc-
ess should be used for certain crimes. The key policy makers 
upon whom appellate court attention should focus in this area are 
prosecutors. 
In addition to illustrating the role of appellate courts in de-
veloping systematic legal theories for disposition, the Article 
briefly surveyed two types of sentencing reforms that are likely to 
dominate public debate. One such reform, the elimination of pa-
role, is intended to make sentences more definite; but a critical 
examination of one such proposal has revealed that discretion per-
sists under this proposal. 
This Article argues strongly against such reform because it 
assumes that decision makers can separate the punishment issues 
from the responsibility issues. The suggestion here is that in re-
viewing parole board decisions, courts should define the unique 
dispositional role of parole boards: to assess and evaluate individ-
ual risks. Under appellate court supervision, sentencing judges 
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should assess the social risks posed by the individual's conduct. 
Both prevailing practices and proposed reforms allow trial judges 
and parole boards to justify their decisions by emphasizing the 
individual and social risks presented by the individual's conduct. 
Another fashionable sentencing reform is legislative delega-
tion of specific rule-making power to commissions and study 
groups.251 The analysis proposed here suggests that this strategy is 
unworkable. The legislature's failure to acknowledge the role of 
appellate courts in its sentencing reform should not lead one to 
conclude that the courts will not play an important part in these 
reforms. Commissions, for all their positive aspects, lack the 
moral authority and perspective necessary to formulate disposi-
tional policy that relates to the individuals involved in the crimi-
nal process. Many of these persons are in fact both offenders and 
victims.252 
Despite the current intellectual fashionability of mandatory 
sentencing and the growing political popularity of such reform, 
the hope raised here is that the call for mandatory sentencing will 
be resisted. Reform of our present sentencing practice should in-
volve at least three major components. First, the reform should 
require policy clarification and articulation. The mere assertion 
that rehabilitation fails does not alone constitute a promulgation 
of policy by legal decision makers. Second, sentencing reform re-
quires new concepts of the appropriate mechanisms of disposi-
tional decision making. Importing concepts from adjudication 
such as "presumptive sentencing" does not answer basic questions 
such as who must ultimately determine whether general deter-
rence ought to be the goal. Third, facing these two large issues 
requires a method of value analysis and a method of resolving 
conflicts among values. While all decision makers engage explic-
itly or implicitly in value analysis, the contention here has been 
that appellate courts must ultimately assume this role within the 
modern criminal process. 
251. See Schwartz, Riform ofthe Federal Criminal Laws: Issues, Tactics, and Pros-
pects, 41 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. I, 22-25 (1977). 
252. See Goldstein, The Meaning of Calley, NEW REPUBLIC, May 8, 1971, at 13-
14, reprinted in J. GOLDSTEIN, A. DERSHOWITZ & R. SCHWARTZ, supra note 24, at 
1022-23. 
